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No More Secret Laws: How Transparency of
Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the
Terrorists Win
Sudha Setty*
Inter arma enim silent leges.1
(In times of war, the law falls silent.)
Whatever the general merits of the view that war silences law or
modulates its voice, that view has no place in the interpretation and
application of a Constitution designed precisely to confront war and, in
a manner that accords with democratic principles, to accommodate it.2

I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the key hallmarks of a democratic nation is that there are no
secret laws.3 In the post-September 11, 2001 era, the George W. Bush
administration relied on national security concerns and the unitary
executive theory of presidential power as justifications for maintaining
secret legal policies that govern parts of the war on terrorism that affect
serious issues of human rights and civil liberties. These legal policies
sometimes staked out positions that are at odds with legislation, treaties,
and court decisions4—but the parameters of the executive branch legal
*
Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. A.B., Stanford
University; J.D., Columbia Law School. I owe great thanks to those who discussed with me the
ideas in this Article, or who reviewed and commented on drafts, including Jill Anderson, Erin
Buzuvis, Matthew Charity, Robert Chesney, Kathleen Clark, Jamison Colburn, Anil Kalhan,
Pratibha Kanive, Richard Kay, Gil Kujovich, Sylvia Lazos, Carol Liebman, Lance Liebman, Peter
Margulies, Susan Martyn, Tayyab Mahmud, Bruce Miller, Trevor Morrison, Giovanna Shay, and
James Wilson. I benefited greatly from the insight and commentary of participants at the 2008 MidAtlantic People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference, where I presented a draft of this paper.
Finally, my thanks to John Hejduk for his research assistance.
1. 14 CICERO, Pro T. Annio Milone Oratio, in PRO MILONE–IN PISONEM–PRO SCAURO–PRO
FONTEIO–PRO RABIRIO POSTUMO–PRO MARCELLO–PRO LIGARIO–PRO REGE DEIOTARIO 16–17
(N.H. Watts trans., Harvard Univ. Press, 6th prtg. 1979).
2. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969) (“[T]he attempt to create
and maintain a system of legal rules may miscarry [if there is] a failure to publicize, or at least to
make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe.”).
4. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 498 (2006)
(noting that “[i]n many areas, the constitutional law enunciated in formal opinions and memoranda
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policies were sometimes unknown because of the lack of public
disclosure.5 Administration critics decried the use of secret legal policy,
and called for the disclosure of legal opinions generated by the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel. Some opinions were
disclosed in the waning days of the Bush administration, others were
disclosed early in the Obama administration, and still others remain
unpublished and unknown.
This Article considers the call for disclosure and concludes that it is
feasible, desirable, and realistic to expect the timely disclosure of most
Office of Legal Counsel opinions. This Article recognizes the historical
pattern of politicization of executive branch legal policy during a war or
armed conflict, then analyzes how secrecy in the development and
implementation of legal policy runs afoul of the rule of law,
compromises the quality of legal policy being generated by the Office of
Legal Counsel, and undermines public confidence in the integrity of
executive branch constitutional interpretation. This Article uses both a
historical and a comparative analysis to critique the use of secret law;
first, by considering how the United States has historically dealt with the
development of executive branch legal policy in wartime; second, by
illustrating how other nations that face severe national security threats
maintain greater transparency and accessibility for legal policy related to
national security matters; and third, how the use of unitary executive
theory to support nondisclosure is at odds with historical practice and the
rule of law.
Part II outlines the history of the Office of the Attorney General and
the Office of Legal Counsel, offers examples of the politicization of
executive branch legal policy during times of conflict, and places in
context the politicized opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel under the
Bush administration.
Part III critiques the process by which the Office of Legal Counsel
under the Bush administration developed, disseminated, and authorized
legal policy without proper internal or external safeguards as to the
quality of opinions being issued.
Part IV notes that scholars have promoted disclosure of executive
branch legal policy as one of many potential means of countering the
effects of a politicized environment within the Department of Justice.
This part outlines the need for a general policy of disclosure in terms of
issued by the Office of Legal Counsel . . . is sometimes at least as important as any decision of
Article III courts”).
5. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities:
Improving Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1055 (2008).
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increasing the quality of the opinions issued, curbing the greatest
excesses of the secret opinions, and asserts the need for a new mandatory
disclosure requirement for future administrations.
Part V addresses whether a call for disclosure is workable in light of
two typical rebuttals offered by U.S. administrations: the pragmatic
argument that secrecy and non-disclosure are necessary to maintain the
integrity of the national security efforts, and that the lack of disclosure is
consistent with the President’s powers, particularly during wartime. This
part critiques both of those arguments in favor of secret law, based on
Congress’s constitutional powers for oversight of the Executive,
historical practices of the United States, as well as a comparative analysis
with India, Israel, and the United Kingdom.
II. THE POLITICIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
One of the fundamental responsibilities of the U.S. Attorney General
and his or her subordinates in the Office of Legal Counsel is to provide
legal advice and counsel to the administration.6 As the chief legal officer
of the United States, the Attorney General has an obligation to uphold
the rule of law by providing the best possible legal counsel to the
President and administration and to limit the effect of political pressures
to mold his or her opinion to facilitate the political goals of the
President.7 The importance of adhering to the rule of law is compounded
when the legal opinions offered by the Attorney General are used as legal
comfort—protecting government actors from future liability and criminal
prosecution while conducting work on behalf of the administration.8
6. NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789–1990, at 1–2 (1992); see Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the
Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1577 (2007) (noting
that the opinions generated by the Office of Legal Counsel are generally considered binding on the
executive branch, unless the President or Attorney General disagrees based on a differing legal
interpretation).
7. Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SEC.
LAW & POL’Y 455, 464–66 (2005) (“When a lawyer gives legal advice . . . she has a professional
obligation of candor toward her client . . . . [T]he lawyer’s role is not simply to spin out creative
legal arguments. It is to offer her assessment of the law as objectively as possible.” (citing MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2003))). Clark contrasts this obligation of a legal advisor to
offer his or her “best assessment” of the law with that of a legal advocate, who can offer any nonfrivolous interpretation of the law when arguing on behalf of a client before a judge. Id. at 465; see
also Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 55 (2008) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing Transcript] (statement of Sen. Whitehouse) (noting
that the Attorney General has “assumed the role, in essence, of, sort of, a corporate counsel to the
executive branch”).
8. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 96 (2007) (quoting a senior Justice Department prosecutor noting that it is
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However, numerous obstacles exist to the Office of Legal Counsel
offering its most impartial, and arguably best, assessment of the law,
including the inherent conflicts of interest which arise when the
administration attempts to influence the Office of Legal Counsel to issue
opinions that are politically advantageous to the administration.9
Historically, this political pressure has been brought to bear during times
of war or armed conflict, raising doubts as to whether any administration
can achieve the “best practice” of offering non-politicized legal advice at
all times.10
A. The Roles of the Attorney General and the Office of Legal Counsel
The history of the roles of the Attorney General and the Office of
Legal Counsel provide insight into the pattern of politicization of these
offices in wartime.
The role of Attorney General has existed since prior to the inception
of the federal government,11 having been modeled after the English
governmental system and the colonial state governments in America,12
and was established at the federal level by the Judiciary Act of 1789.13
In enacting the Judiciary Act, Congress and the President delegated
executive branch constitutional interpretation to the Office of the
Attorney General.14
The tension between the Attorney General’s dual obligations—on
the one hand to render the highest quality legal advice possible to the
President, and on the other hand to offer politically advantageous
opinions to the President—has existed from the very beginning of the
office in the U.S. federal system.15 President Washington made it clear
to Edmund Randolph, the first U.S. Attorney General, that he wanted the
Attorney General to be “a skilled, neutral expounder of the law rather
“‘practically impossible to prosecute someone who relied in good faith on an [Office of Legal
Counsel] opinion, even if the opinion turns out to be wrong’”).
9. Clark, supra note 7, at 464–65.
10. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 34–35 (noting that the OLC should offer opinions
that strike a balance between a neutral exposition of the law and client advocacy on behalf of the
administration’s desired result); Walter Dellinger et al., Principles to Guide the Office of Legal
Counsel (2004), reprinted in Johnsen, supra note 6, app. 2 at 1603–04 (calling for the OLC to
maintain a non-politicized stance in developing legal policy).
11. BAKER, supra note 6, at 37.
12. Id. at 37–38.
13. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 511
(2006)).
14. GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 32.
15. BAKER, supra note 6, at 55.
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than a political advisor.”16 In response, Randolph wrote to Washington
in 1794, shortly after the end of his term in office:
[M]y opinions, not containing any systematic adherence to party, but
arising solely from my views of right, fall sometimes on one side and
sometimes on the other . . . . [W]hile I retain a consciousness of my
ability to resist an undue influence, I cannot deny the satisfaction which
I feel in maintaining [my reasoning]. . . . I have often indeed expressed
sentiments contrary to yours. This was my duty; because they were my
sentiments. But, Sir, they were never tinctured by any other motive,
than to present to your reflection the misconstructions which wicked
men might make of your views, and to hold out to you a truth of
infinite importance to the United States . . . .17

Although the Attorney General originally served as a counselor to
both the President and to Congress,18 the Attorney General and the
Department of Justice are now understood to be firmly within the
auspices of the executive branch.19
The Office of Legal Counsel, generally referred to as the OLC, has
been in existence since 1933 as part of the Department of Justice.20 Its
role is to provide legal advice on the actions of all of the administrative
departments that report to the President: it makes a determination on
whether proposed actions and programs are illegal or unconstitutional,
and provides advice to the President as to whether programs should be
cancelled or modified due to legal constraints.21 In fact, the OLC
16. Griffin B. Bell, Office of Attorney General’s Client Relationship, 36 BUS. LAW. 791, 791
(1981).
17. Letter from Edmond Randolph to George Washington (Apr. 19, 1794), in MONCURE
DANIEL CONWAY, OMITTED CHAPTERS OF HISTORY DISCLOSED IN THE LIFE AND PAPERS OF
EDMUND RANDOLPH 218–19 (1888).
18. In large part, the Office of the Attorney General and its role in government were not given a
close examination at the time they were adopted into the U.S. federal system—it was simply
understood that the President and Congress required legal counsel, and that the Attorney General
could provide the necessary advice to both of the political branches of government. BAKER, supra
note 6, at 15.
19. Id. at 16, 59. Nonetheless, some argue that there remains a residual tension as to how much
information the Attorney General is obligated to disclose to Congress, particularly with regard to the
legal policy developed and implemented by the executive branch. Id. at 10–11. Baker notes a
second tension arising from the Attorney General’s role as counselor to the administration and his or
her role as an officer of the court. Id. at 2, 22–25.
20. Id. at 10–11.
21. GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 32; see also Office of Legal Counsel Homepage, http://
www.usdoj.gov/olc (last visited Apr. 11, 2008) (noting that the OLC “is responsible for providing
legal advice to the executive branch on all constitutional questions”). The client of the OLC, as with
the Attorney General, is generally understood to be the administration as a whole. See BAKER,
supra note 6, at 10–11. This sets the OLC apart from the Office of the White House Counsel—a
presidential appointee who serves as the President’s personal counsel and adviser. See generally
Maryanne Borrelli et al., The White House Counsel’s Office, 31 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 561 (2001),
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“renders all but a small portion of the formal legal opinions of the
Department of Justice.”22 The head of the OLC reports to the Attorney
General.23
The OLC has been viewed historically as the first line of defense
against self-serving legal interpretation by the executive branch.24
However, as the OLC is obligated to respond to real-time legal questions,
the danger of politicization or other undermining of the integrity of the
opinions becomes pressing: there are few mandated external controls
over the OLC, no oversight outside the direct chain of command in the
administration, and no public accountability for the legal policy being
developed and relied upon.25 Over the years, the OLC has avoided some
of the pitfalls that exist from a lack of accountability by operating under
strong cultural norms of apoliticism.26 However, that culture has not
always been maintained, both in the OLC27 and in the Justice Department
as a whole.
B. Historical Examples of the Attorney General Facilitating the Accrual
of Presidential Power
This tension is often dormant, and the public becomes aware of its
existence only when it flares up; for example, when the Attorney General
or the OLC offers an opinion based primarily on political exigency,28 as
opposed to balancing the interests of the administration and the
obligation to give sound legal advice.29

available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6387/is_/ai_n25554509.
22. Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the Office
of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1308 (2000).
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 510 (2000) (codifying the right of the Attorney General to delegate the
responsibility to draft legal opinions to the OLC); §§ 511–513 (delineating the Attorney General’s
authority to render legal opinions to the President and executive branch); see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.25
(2008) (describing matters assigned to the Assistant Attorney General); GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at
32 (describing the trend of recent Attorneys General delegating the legal advisory function to OLC).
24. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 33.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE
MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 34 (Stephen J. Wayne, ed., 1992) (arguing that because the OLC is asked
to develop legal policies that support administration goals, it is often viewed as one of the most
politicized units within the Department of Justice).
28. I am referring to the interests of an administration based on political needs, not necessarily
influenced by partisan politics.
29. See SAM J. ERVIN, JR., THE WHOLE TRUTH: THE WATERGATE CONSPIRACY 118–19 (1980)
(discussing the public belief that the Department of Justice was wholly politicized in its rendering of
legal opinions for President Richard Nixon).
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As with the George W. Bush administration, this tension consistently
occurs during a war or other military conflict when a President believes
that he can and should assert greater executive power under the
Commander-in-Chief clause30 to respond appropriately to wartime
crises.31 Controversial examples of this type of wartime action are found
throughout U.S. history, and two such examples illustrate the same
tension that existed in the Bush administration.
The first is the legal comfort offered by Abraham Lincoln’s Attorney
General, Edward Bates, to authorize the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus for Confederate soldiers during the Civil War.32 This was a
decision that Bates made reluctantly in order to support Lincoln’s already
articulated war strategy.33 Bates set aside his misgivings about the
legality of the suspension of the writ to support the President’s Civil War
strategy,34 authoring an opinion that acknowledged both the right of the
court to issue a writ of habeas corpus, as the well as the President’s right
to refuse to obey such a writ.35
To gain support for his war plan, Lincoln heavily publicized his
belief that the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was necessary to
the Union Army’s wartime efforts.36 There is no doubt that Lincoln
consolidated and increased presidential power in response to the
exigencies of war, and that the decision to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus was part of that effort;37 there is also no doubt that Lincoln’s
efforts were well-known and his shift in legal policy was subject to

30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
31. See Johnsen, supra note 6, at 1560 (“President Bush and his lawyers have espoused an
extreme view of expansive presidential power during times of war and national emergency, a view
that draws especially on the President’s constitutional role as commander-in-chief.”).
32. Bates’ opinion was issued on July 5, 1861. J. FRANKLIN JAMESON, DICTIONARY OF
UNITED STATES HISTORY: 1492–1895, at 284 (1894). Lincoln ordered the arrest and detention of
Confederate soldiers in April of 1861, see Abraham Lincoln, Executive Order to the Commanding
General of the Army of the United States (Apr. 27, 1861), in 7 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1784–1897, at 3219 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter
MESSAGES AND PAPERS], making clear that although Bates’ opinion was valuable to Lincoln, it was
not the decisive opinion on whether to suspend the writ. Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law:
National Security Agendas, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers, 68 MD. L.
REV. 1, 71–73 (2008); see also David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at
its Lowest Ebb: A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 998–1000 (2008).
33. BAKER, supra note 6, at 3.
34. Id.
35. CLAYTON, supra note 27, at 20.
36. The most notable effort was Lincoln’s July 4, 1861 address to Congress, in which he argued
that the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was necessary to preserve the nation. See Abraham
Lincoln, Special Session Message (July 4, 1861), in 7 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 32, at
3226–27.
37. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., WAR AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 50–51 (2004).
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significant public scrutiny.38 Further, as a result of the publicity, efforts
to build a consensus, public support, and congressional concern over the
war, Congress passed resolutions in support of the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus for Confederate soldiers.39
A second example in which the “best assessment” of legal counsel
was subsumed by political interests was the decision by Francis Biddle,
Franklin Roosevelt’s Attorney General, to acquiesce to the internment of
Japanese Americans during World War II under Roosevelt’s war-making
powers as President.40 Although evidence suggests that the decision to
offer legal comfort for the internment was made against Biddle’s
judgment as to the best interpretation of the law,41 and perhaps even
against his judgment as to a morally or legally defensible argument,
Biddle reconciled himself to supporting Roosevelt’s plan to intern
Japanese Americans to alleviate perceived national security concerns.42
Roosevelt, like Lincoln nearly a century before, publicized his decision
and rallied public support for the measure.43 In fact, Congress supported
38. GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 82–83.
39. JAMESON, supra note 32, at 284. Lincoln’s desire to suspend the writ of habeas corpus was
met with strident opposition from Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. In Ex
parte Merryman, Taney denied the right of the President to suspend the writ, with Taney offering the
following indictment of Lincoln’s attempt to, in Taney’s view, subvert the rule of law:
These great and fundamental laws, which congress itself could not suspend, have been
disregarded and suspended, like the writ of habeas corpus, by a military order, supported
by force of arms. . . . I can only say that if the authority which the constitution has
confided to the judiciary department and judicial officers, may thus, upon any pretext or
under any circumstances, be usurped by the military power, at its discretion, the people of
the United States are no longer living under a government of laws, but every citizen holds
life, liberty and property at the will and pleasure of the army officer in whose military
district he may happen to be found.
17 F. Cas. 144, 152 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). Later, the Court authorized the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War, for the limited context of when Confederate soldiers
were captured but civilian courts were fully closed. See generally Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2 (1866).
40. See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942) (allowing for the internment of
Japanese and Japanese American people due to national security concerns). See generally COMM’N
ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED (1982).
Biddle’s advice was later validated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that the decision of President Roosevelt to intern Japanese Americans
during World War II was consistent with the President’s war powers).
41. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 37, at 56 (noting that Biddle opposed the internment of
Japanese Americans).
42. See BAKER, supra note 6, at 34 (arguing Biddle “questioned the constitutionality of
interning those who were U.S. citizens” but still acquiesced).
43. See Peter Margulies, When to Push the Envelope: Legal Ethics, the Rule of Law, and
National Security Strategy, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 642, 651 (noting that the legal defense of
internment “hinged on a stereotype of Japanese-Americans as insidious and inscrutable security
risks” and that government lawyers appealed to the court’s acceptance of “the discrimination that
Japanese-Americans had frequently faced in the United States”). In 1982, the congressionally
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the President’s decision,44 and the constitutionality of the internment was
validated in 1944 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United
States.45
In the cases of Bates and Biddle, the politicization of the Office of
the Attorney General occurred in a time of great national tension, when
the President was exercising his wartime powers. Although the
justifications for offering legal comfort may in retrospect seem tenuous
at best,46 the fact that the decision-making was made public and in
consultation with Congress allowed for some measure of public
confidence in the making of executive branch legal policy,47 and, perhaps
more importantly, the opportunity for public scrutiny to force changes in
bad policy.48
charged Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians concluded that there was
no military necessity for internment; rather, it was a product of wider societal and governmental
problems including “race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership.” ERIC K.
YAMAMATO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT 40 (2001).
Scholars have noted that Roosevelt’s ability to rally public, congressional and judicial support
for his wartime policies cemented the perceived need for executive flexibility in carrying out
controversial policies in times of emergency. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Small Emergencies, 40 GA.
L. REV. 835, 850–51 (2006) (concluding that “[e]mergency powers had been given a judicial stamp
of approval” and that “Congress continued to cede powers to Roosevelt, but often after Roosevelt’s
impassioned public addresses threatened to seize the power”).
44. Congress validated Executive Order No. 9066 explicitly by making it a misdemeanor to
disregard the Order’s curfew and movement restrictions. Act of Mar. 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat.
173; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (validating the curfew requirements
of the 1942 Act).
45. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Korematsu’s conviction for being found outside of an exclusionary
zone for persons of Japanese descent was overturned in 1984. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.
Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Judge Patel, in overturning the conviction, noted that “[f]ortunately,
there are few instances in our judicial history when courts have been called upon to undo such
profound and publicly acknowledged injustice.” Id. at 1413.
46. In contrast, other administrations have leveraged the fact that the Department of Justice,
unlike other administrative agencies, has no particular industry or special interest group to answer to
and is, therefore, most prone to unilateral presidential control. See CLAYTON, supra note 27, at 77–
78 (noting that President Nixon exercised a great deal of control over the Department of Justice).
47. Johnsen, supra note 6, at 1590 (noting that when President Ronald Reagan wanted to put
forth a different constitutional provision than had previously been used by Congress and the
judiciary, he made that debate public). Publicity, however, does not guarantee accountability. In the
case of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the judiciary attempted to check President
Lincoln’s actions. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (denying
the right of the President to suspend the writ). President Lincoln chose not to comply with regard to
Confederate soldiers taken prisoner by Union forces. BAKER, supra note 6, at 20.
48. In contrast, the legal advice offered during the presidency of Richard Nixon has been
criticized both for substance and the secrecy in which it was shrouded. See United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 703–07 (1974) (accepting the idea of a broad deliberative privilege for a President, but
rejecting the right of executive branch constitutional interpretation to trump that of the judiciary); see
also Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 2. Sen. Patrick Leahy commented to Attorney
General Michael Mukasey:
I first came to the Senate 33 years ago. The nation and the Department of Justice were
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C. Current Examples of the Politicization of the Office of Legal Counsel
During the years of the George W. Bush administration, the Office of
Legal Counsel drafted numerous memoranda and legal opinions that
engendered a great deal of criticism on two fronts: first, for the substance
of the policies promulgated.49 As with the examples of Bates and Biddle,
one criticism of the OLC is that its legal advice facilitates a vast
expansion of presidential power. The second body of criticism stems
from the process by which the OLC developed and implemented its legal
policy.50 In sharp contrast to the Bates and Biddle examples, the primary
concern here is the secretive process by which legal policy is developed
and implemented.51
In fact, the Bush administration’s concerted effort to cut the judiciary
and Congress out of the decision-making process on legal policy is the
antithesis of the approach undertaken by the Lincoln and Roosevelt
administrations.52 Although issues of war and armed conflict have
affected many administrations, when executive branch legal policy is not
reeling from Watergate. The trust of the American people in their government had been
shaken. The damage done over the last seven years to our constitutional democracy and
our civil liberties rival the worst of those dark days. This president’s administration has
repeatedly ignored the checks and balances that have been wisely placed on executive
power by our founders . . . . [A]mong the most disturbing aspects of those years has been
the complicity of the Justice Department, which has provided cover for the worst of these
practices during those seven years.
Id.
49. See Clark, supra note 7, at 458–63 (arguing that the U.S. Government relied on inaccurate
statements of law in setting interrogation policies); Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the Door:
Balancing National Security with Privacy Under the USA PATRIOT Act, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 375,
379–80 (2002) (addressing the effects of the PATRIOT Act on individual privacy rights); Beth
Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration’s Efforts to Limit Human Rights
Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 182 (2004) (documenting the attempts of the George W.
Bush administration to curtail judicial review in cases of alleged human rights violations by the U.S.
government).
50. See generally GOLDSMITH, supra note 8 (examining the “role that lawyers played in
determining counterterrorism policy”); Johnsen, supra note 6 (advocating the need for internal legal
constraints in the executive branch); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive
Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1250–58 (2006) (noting the executive branch’s use of
constitutional avoidance theory to assert its right to circumvent the parameters of FISA); H.
Jefferson Powell, The Executive and the Avoidance Canon, 81 IND. L.J. 1313 (2006) (arguing the
avoidance canon should not be used on issues regarding the separation of powers between Congress
and the President).
51. SCHLESINGER, supra note 37, at 61 (concluding that the last Bush administration was the
most secretive in U.S. history, including the Nixon administration); Scott Shane et al., Secret U.S.
Endorsement of Severe Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at A1 (noting that the last Bush
administration adapted new legal policies on interrogation “without public debate or Congressional
vote, choosing to rely instead on the confidential legal advice of a handful of appointees”).
52. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 82–85; Jeffrey Rosen, Conscience of a Conservative,
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 9, 2007, at 40, 45.
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disclosed in a meaningful fashion to other parts of the administration, the
other branches of the federal government, or to the public, it is clear that
the quality of the legal policy, as well as the credibility of the
administration’s lawyers, suffers greatly.
A number of examples of controversial and secret legal opinions
evidence the Bush administration’s expansive view of presidential
powers vis-à-vis the war on terror, and the intense interest in excluding
Congress, the public, and even other departments within the executive
branch53 from understanding the parameters of executive branch legal
policy.54
First, two August 2002 OLC memoranda (the “Bybee Memoranda”)
analyzed the definition of “torture” with regard to interrogation
techniques used on persons captured in the war on terror and held outside
of the United States. The first memorandum55 was drafted by OLC
attorney John Yoo56 and signed by Assistant Attorney General Jay
Bybee. Although the administration relied on this memorandum since
2002 to delineate those interrogation techniques that were arguably
lawful,57 the memorandum itself was only made public after it was
53. Not every OLC opinion related to national security matters was insulated from other
administrative departments. E.g., Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, U.S.
Dep’t of State, to John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 11, 2002),
available at https://www.pegc.us/archive/State_Department/taft_memo20020111.pdf. In a cover
letter accompaning a forty-page critique of an OLC draft memorandum regarding detainee treatment,
Taft notes that “both the most important factual assumptions on which [Yoo’s] draft is based and its
legal analysis are seriously flawed.” Id. at 1; see also M. Elizabeth Magill, Can Process Cure
Substance? A Response to Neal Katyal’s “Internal Separation of Powers,” 116 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 126, 130 (2006) (stating that the last Bush administration was aware of opposing arguments
but disagreed with them).
54. The concern about secret laws and rules developed by the last Bush administration extends
beyond the OLC. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Take Your Paws off the Presidency!, SLATE, July 15,
2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2195384index.html (discussing the possibility of secret executive
orders in place that would alter the presidential succession process notwithstanding constitutional
and congressional constraints).
55. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of
Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee
Memorandum]. The Bybee Memorandum was superseded, in part, by another memorandum drafted
by the acting head of the OLC, Daniel Levin, that addressed the applicability of the Convention
Against Torture and disavowed some of the conclusions made in the Bybee Memorandum. See
Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Legal
Counsel, to James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Levin Memorandum].
56. John Yoo, Behind the ‘Torture Memos,’ SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 2, 2005, at 1P
(acknowledging that he helped to draft the Bybee Memorandum).
57. The Defense Department incorporated significant portions of the language from the Bybee
Memorandum in its own report on interrogation practices. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., WORKING
GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 61–69 (2003)
(enumerating thirty-five techniques and evaluating the usefulness of those techniques); see also
Douglas Jehl et al., C.I.A. Is Seen as Seeking New Role on Detainees: Officials Say Agency Is
Fearful of Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at A16 (explaining that the Bybee Memorandum was
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leaked in mid-2004 after the public learned of detainee abuses at the Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq.58 At that point, congressional and public outrage
at the content of the memorandum,59 which authorized the use of harsh
interrogation techniques and narrowed the conventional definition of
torture60 to provide legal comfort to interrogators who engaged in harsh
techniques,61 forced the President to disavow the use of torture during
interrogations.62
The second August 2002 memorandum—issued on the same day as
the first and also authorized by Bybee63—reinforced the administration’s
view that the definition of torture was extremely narrow and required
specific intent by interrogators to cause serious physical or mental harm,
“sought by the C.I.A. to protect its employees from liability”).
58. See Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture, WASH.
POST, June 8, 2004, at A1 (“[T]he Justice Department advised the White House that torturing alQaeda terrorists in captivity abroad ‘may be justified,’ and that international laws against torture
‘may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations’ conducted in President Bush’s war on
terrorism.”); see also From the Department of Justice to Guantanamo Bay: Administration Lawyers
and Administration Interrogation Rules, Part III: Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil
Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter
Interrogation Rules, Schroeder Statement], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
Schroeder080626.pdf (statement of Christopher H. Schroeder, Professor of Law & Pub. Pol’y Stud.,
Duke Univ.) (“[T]o this day, we might not know of the existence of this memo had it not been
leaked around the time that the photographs from Abu Ghraib were being exposed.”). A
contemporaneous OLC memorandum on interrogation techniques remains secret from the public.
Id. at 3.
59. See Adam Liptak, Legal Scholars Criticize Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2004,
at A14 (“[A] law professor at the University of Chicago said: ‘It’s egregiously bad. It’s very low
level, it’s very weak, embarrassingly weak, just short of reckless.’”). Compare Posting of Jack
Balkin to Balkinization, Arguments That Make You Ashamed to be a Lawyer, http://
balkin.blogspot.com/2004/06/arguments-that-make-you-ashamed-to-be.html (June 9, 2004, 12:14
EST) (“The torture memo . . . makes the President a King, someone who must be presumed to do no
wrong. If the President adopted this position, and acted upon it, it would be grounds for
impeachment.”), with Adrian Vermeule & Eric A. Posner, A ‘Torture’ Memo and Its Tortuous
Critics, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2004, at A22 (arguing that the Bybee Memorandum “falls well within
the bounds of professionally respectable argument”).
60. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 55, at 46 (“[W]e conclude that torture as defined in and
proscribed by [the Convention Against Torture] covers only extreme acts. . . . Because the acts
inflicting torture are extreme, there is [a] significant range of acts that though they might constitute
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment fail to rise to the level of torture.”). The
Bybee Memorandum also stated that the proscriptions of the Convention Against Torture likely did
not apply to the President’s execution of the war on terror, under the rationale that the Convention
infringed upon the President’s executive authority as Commander-in-Chief. See id. at 36–39 (“[T]he
structure of the Constitution demonstrates that any power traditionally understood as pertaining to
the executive—which includes the conduct of warfare and the defense of the nation—unless
expressly assigned in the Consitution to Congress, is vested in the President.”).
61. Additionally, Bybee offered two broad defenses to individuals who used techniques which
would fall within the narrowed definition of torture: necessity and self-defense. Id. at 39–46.
62. Eric Mink, Editorial, The Torture Memos, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 2008, at D11.
See generally Shane et al., supra note 51, at A1; Levin Memorandum, supra note 55.
63. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of
Legal Counsel (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Second Bybee Memorandum].
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and that interrogators were protected from future prosecution because
they had no such specific intent.64 A heavily redacted version of this
memorandum was released by the administration on July 24, 2008, in
response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request from the
American Civil Liberties Union.65
Tellingly, only the late 2004 OLC memorandum declaring that
“‘torture is abhorrent both to American law and values and to
international norms’” was voluntarily made public by the
administration.66 However, even this memorandum contained legal
protection for CIA interrogators to reassure them that past practices were
not prosecutable.67
Second, a 2002 executive order issued by President Bush68
authorized the National Security Agency to conduct warrantless
surveillance programs over U.S. citizens, which were authorized by the
OLC69 but not revealed to the judiciary, including the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)70 court.71 This executive order was
not disclosed until late 2005, at which point Congress immediately
demanded to be briefed on the program to understand its parameters.72

64. Id. at 16–17.
65. See American Civil Liberties Union, Documents Released by the CIA and Justice
Department in Response to the ACLU’s Torture FOIA (July 24, 2008), http://www.aclu.org/
safefree/torture/36104res20080724.html.
66. Shane et al., supra note 51.
67. Id.; Levin Memorandum, supra note 55, at 17.
68. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
69. Jack Goldsmith stated that the White House systematically undermined FISA protections
using secret and “‘flimsy’” legal opinions which were “‘guarded closely so no one could question
the legal basis for the operations.’” Rosen, supra note 52, at 45. The OLC has also opined that
Fourth Amendment protections against unlawful search and seizure do not apply to “domestic
military operations.” Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to William J.
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def. 8 n.10 (Mar. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Yoo Memorandum]
(referring back to an earlier, still-secret OLC memorandum entitled, “Authority for Use of Military
Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States”).
70. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1863, 1871 (2000).
71. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 68.
72. See Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 4 (disagreeing with the President’s view
that warrantless wiretapping is within the President’s inherent executive authority, and arguing that
the President cannot be above the rule of law); Scott Shane & Eric Lichtblau, Full House Committee
Gets Briefing on Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2006, at A22; Charles Babington, White House
Agrees to Brief Congress on NSA Surveillance, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2006, at A6; Nancy Pelosi,
Editorial, The Gap in Intelligence Oversight, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2006, at B7; Memorandum from
Alberto R. Gonzales, Att’y Gen., to William H. Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate 1–3, 6–36 (Jan.
19, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf. For a
detailed analysis of the legality of the NSA wiretapping program, see generally John Cary Sims,
What NSA Is Doing . . . and Why It’s Illegal, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105 (2006).
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Third, a March 2003 memorandum authored by Yoo (the “Yoo
Memorandum”)73 provided additional legal comfort to interrogators by
asserting that “federal laws prohibiting assault, maiming and other
[violent] crimes did not apply to military interrogators” who questioned
captives in the war on terror, based on the President’s wartime powers.74
The Yoo Memorandum sought to insulate U.S. government agents
from prosecution or other legal liability if they used highly coercive
interrogation techniques, such as waterboarding, head-slapping, and
exposure of prisoners to extreme temperatures.75
The existence of this memorandum had been known outside of the
administration for several years, despite the administration’s refusal to
disclose it to the public or most members of Congress until April 1,
2008.76 The memorandum was initially classified by the Department of
Justice to prevent disclosure, but was ultimately declassified after a
review undertaken as part of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
brought by the American Civil Liberties Union to gain access to the
memorandum.77
The initial classification of the Yoo Memorandum was made because
of purported national security concerns associated with the release of the
opinion;78 remarkably, however, the contents of the Yoo Memorandum
were kept secret from the top lawyers for each branch of the military.79
Since the public release of the Yoo Memorandum, scholars have
questioned why such an opinion—containing no sensitive personal
information nor details about specific intelligence-gathering programs—
was ever withheld from public view.80
Fourth, a 2005 opinion authorized harsh techniques, such as
waterboarding, and the use of such techniques in combination with each
other, for the interrogation of persons designated as enemy combatants.81
This opinion was issued soon after Alberto Gonzales began his tenure as
73. Yoo Memorandum, supra note 69.
74. Dan Eggen & Josh White, Memo: Laws Didn’t Apply to Interrogators, WASH. POST, Apr.
2, 2008, at A1.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Secret Bush Administration Torture Memo
Released Today in Response to ACLU Lawsuit (Apr. 1, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/
safefree/torture/34747prs20080401.html.
78. Eggen & White, supra note 74.
79. Id.
80. Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, Full Employment Memo for Bloggers (and
Prosecutors?),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/04/full-employment-memo-for-bloggers-and.html
(Apr. 1, 2008, 20:25 EST).
81. Shane et al., supra note 51.
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Attorney General in February 2005, over the objection of then-Deputy
Attorney General James Comey.82
Fifth, a late 2005 opinion was drafted after Congress passed the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,83 which had specifically outlawed some
harsh interrogation techniques.84 This opinion confirmed that the CIA
practices could be reconciled with the Detainee Treatment Act’s
restrictions, once again providing legal cover for CIA interrogators,
should later decision makers conclude that the practices were illegal.85
Finally, an unpublished 2006 executive order—reviewed and
approved by the OLC—confirmed authorization for the use of
“enhanced” interrogation techniques.86 Additional memoranda regarding
interrogation techniques have been issued, but not made public.87
Much of the substantive criticism of these memos has turned on the
expansive assertion of executive power,88 the resulting erosion of due
process and human rights protections for persons designated as “enemy
combatants,”89 and the weakening of privacy and civil liberties
protections of U.S. citizens.90 Procedurally, the Bush administration
exploited a structural flaw, leveraging the lack of a requirement to
disclose its legal policy to make the OLC a tool for the administration,

82. Id. It was later revealed that certain members of Congress were briefed on the use of
waterboarding of prisoners as early as 2002, but that they were forbidden from taking written notes
on the brief, or from disclosing their knowledge to anyone, including their own staff members. Joby
Warrick & Dan Eggen, Hill Briefed on Waterboarding in 2002, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2007, at A1.
Rep. Jane Harman noted that she filed a classified letter objecting to the program, but was prevented
from speaking publicly due to the rules of secrecy governing her role on an intelligence committee.
Id.
83. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005).
84. The Senate followed up on September 26, 2006, by voting 53-46 not to ban waterboarding
as an interrogation technique. Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 4.
85. Shane et al., supra note 51.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The assertion of expansive additional powers by a President is not a phenomenon unique to
the United States. Jenny S. Martinez, Inherent Executive Power: A Comparative Perspective, 115
YALE L.J. 2480, 2506 (2006); Thomas Poguntke & Paul Webb, The Presidentialization of Politics in
Democratic Societies: A Framework for Analysis, in THE PRESIDENTIALIZATION OF POLITICS 1, 1
(Thomas Poguntke & Paul Webb eds., 2005).
89. Eggen & White, supra note 74; Editorial, There Were Orders to Follow, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
4, 2008, at A22 (noting that the Yoo Memorandum was “81 pages of twisted legal reasoning to
justify President Bush’s decision to ignore federal law and international treaties and authorize the
abuse and torture of prisoners”); see also Yoo Memorandum, supra note 69, at 1 (“[T]he Fifth and
Eighth Amendments, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, do not extend to alien enemy combatants
held abroad.”).
90. See generally Sims, supra note 72.
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providing legal comfort for controversial actions for government actors
and private cooperators.91
III. PROCESS CONCERNS AT THE OLC DURING TIMES OF
POLITICIZATION
Critics of the George W. Bush administration argued that the OLC in
earlier administrations was able to maintain a culture of non
politicization in order to provide the soundest legal advice possible,
within some political constraints.92 In contrast, the OLC in the Bush
administration, particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, arguably gave political goals primacy over the best possible legal
advice.93
The marked lack of information disclosure from the Bush
administration regarding legal policy94 served to enable and increase the
politicization, as there existed few external checks on the content and
quality of the legal opinions, and little public or congressional
knowledge of the use and reliance upon these policies.95
A. Culture of the OLC Under Previous Administrations
The OLC, at least in times of peace, historically has maintained its
reputation for high-quality legal analysis and executive branch
constitutional interpretation due to its long-standing culture of
independence from the political motivations of any given
administration.96 The fact that memoranda drafted during previous
91. GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 64–68 (noting that then-White House Counsel Alberto R.
Gonzales began, in early 2002, looking for ways to provide legal comfort for government actors in
light of the restrictions of the Geneva Conventions, War Powers Resolution, FISA and other
statutes); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2337 (2006) (“[When the high-ranking officials at OLC]
become advocates . . . the system breaks down. The decisions of that Office begin to look suspect,
resembling a courtroom flush with political influence rather than law.”).
92. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 33 (“[T]he office has developed powerful cultural norms
about the importance of providing the President with detached, apolitical legal advice, as if OLC
were an independent court inside the executive branch.”). See generally Dellinger et al., supra note
10.
93. GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 33.
94. Scheppele, supra note 43, at 858–59 (calling the lack of disclosure regarding executive
branch legal policy “unprecedented and not in keeping with the general American approach to
emergency powers”).
95. Eggen & White, supra note 74 (noting that the top lawyers in the different military
branches were not involved in the development of the Yoo Memorandum, nor were they given
copies of the Memorandum once it had been prepared and implemented).
96. GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 33, 145.
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administrations, in which the President was of a different political party,
were still cited with approval by OLC lawyers in a different
administration with different political goals evidences this impartiality.97
Even though the career lawyers at the OLC report to political
appointees, common OLC practice under most administrations
prioritized the quality and impartiality of the legal opinions over their
political utility.98 To further this goal, the OLC strove to avoid political
advocacy whenever possible.99 Further, there was an understanding that
without the belief that the OLC was setting forth objective legal policy,
the credibility of the OLC would be severely jeopardized in the eyes of
the public and the other parts of government.100
B. Changes in OLC Procedures During the Bush Administration
OLC cultural norms and processes during the Bush administration
changed significantly and were a result of the war-time outlook of the
administration and its desire for the maximum possible presidential
authority in constitutional decision-making during the war on terror.101
First, the administration severely limited information disclosure on many
levels: within the Department of Justice, within the administration as a
whole, and to other branches of government and the public.102 Second,
97. See Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, Understanding the OLC Torture Memos
(Part 1), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/01/understanding-olc-torture-memos-part-i.html (Jan. 7,
2005, 9:15 EST) (“[I]n issuing its new memo OLC has taken a critically important step toward
restoring the office’s reputation for providing rigorous and impartial legal advice.”); Posting of
Michael C. Dorf to Findlaw, The Justice Department’s Change of Heart Regarding Torture: A FairMinded and Praiseworthy Analysis That Could Have Gone Still Further, http://writ.news.
findlaw.com/dorf/20050105.html (Jan. 5, 2005).
98. Johnsen, supra note 6, at 1577.
99. Shane et al., supra note 51.
100. Moss, supra note 22, at 1311–12.
101. Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 2–3 (“[Senate oversight] efforts revealed a
Department of Justice gone awry. . . . [Investigation revealed] the United States Attorney firing
scandal, a confrontation over the legality of the administration’s warrantless wiretapping program,
the untoward political influence of the White House at the Department of Justice, and the secret legal
memos excusing all manners of excess. And the crisis of leadership has taken a heavy toll on the
tradition of independence that’s long guided the Justice Department, provided it with safe harbor
from political interference.”) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Sen. Judiciary Comm.).
102. See Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 3 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
(noting the practices of the Justice Department are leading it to be a “department of cloaking
misguided policies under veiled secrecy, leaving Congress, the courts, but especially the American
people in the dark”); Eggen & White, supra note 74 (“The top lawyers for each military service, who
were largely excluded from the group, did not receive a final copy of Yoo’s March memo and did
not know about the group’s final report for more than a year.”); Philip Shenon & Eric Lichtblau,
Justice Nomination Seen as Snub to Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2008, at A16 (noting that the
nomination of Steven G. Bradbury to head up the OLC had stalled repeatedly as the Department of
Justice refused to provide Congress copies of OLC opinions on various terrorism issues).
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the nondisclosure of legal opinions and the opacity of the OLC created
an environment in which other changes could be effected without outside
oversight, including political influence on content and conclusions of the
legal opinions drafted by the OLC.103 Third, the lack of information
disclosure led to the breakdown of other norms such as appropriate
supervision within the OLC104 and the use of external checks, including
consultation with the general counsels for relevant administrative
departments, in developing legal policy.105 Relying on secret legal policy
compromised the quality of legal analysis and the credibility of the OLC,
and denigrated its ability to give legal comfort that would withstand
congressional or public scrutiny.
1. Lack of Information Disclosure
One major shift from prior administrations was the degree to which
information regarding legal policy was not shared with other members of
the Bush administration, or with Congress, despite specific requests for
that information.106
Many of the controversial OLC opinions related to national security
would likely remain unknown to the public but for leaks of the relevant
memoranda or other key documents,107 or protracted litigation

103. Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 72 (“I’m worried we’re not getting enough
clarity on critical issues. We have heard reference to legal opinions, to justifications, facts that
remain hidden from the Congress, the American people. And it’s a hallmark of our democracy that
we say what our laws are and what conduct they prohibit. We’ve seen what’s happened when
hidden decisions are made in secret memos and that’s held from the American people, held from
their representatives here in Congress. It erodes our liberties, but it undermines our values as a
nation of laws.”) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
104. GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 167.
105. Eggen & White, supra note 74.
106. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7; Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Reconsideration, ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., No. 04 Civ. 4151 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2008), available at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/aclu_v_dod_ordergranting_motionforreconsideration.pdf
[hereinafter ACLU FOIA Order] (granting an FOIA request for OLC opinions on the parameters of
harsh interrogation techniques); Shenon & Lichtblau, supra note 102. Additionally, the most visible
examples of stonewalling by the Justice Department do not relate to the OLC opinions themselves.
Instead, they involve issues such as the Justice Department’s failure to comply with congressional
subpoenas for documents related to the potentially politically motivated firings of certain U.S.
Attorneys, as well as then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales refusing to answer questions about the
firings. See Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 3–4 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy);
see also Carrie Johnson, Internal Justice Dept. Report Cites Illegal Hiring Practices, WASH. POST,
July 28, 2008, at A1 (reporting on the findings of the Department of Justice Inspector General that
hiring decisions at the Department of Justice were improperly politicized). Although such issues
tend to grab the attention of the public, to some extent they are easier issues to confront, since both
the request for information and the subsequent refusal to disclose that information are made public.
107. See Johnsen, supra note 6, at 1563, 1599.
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demanding disclosure.108 Without a leak or voluntary administration
disclosure, Congress and the public remained unaware of executive
branch legal policy.109 A number of OLC memoranda that delineated the
Bush administration’s view on the legal parameters of the war on terror
were only released to the public in January 2009, in the waning days of
the Bush administration.110 This lack of disclosure by the OLC is
consistent with the attitude of the administration as a whole. Whereas
under previous administrations, the disclosure of legal opinions and other
documents was routine,112 the Bush administration took a dramatically

108. See ACLU FOIA Order, supra note 106.
109. See Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 71–72 (statement of Sen. Grassley);
Johnsen, supra note 6, at 1563.
110. See USDOJ:OLC, What’s New At OLC, http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/whatsnew.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2009) (indicating that many OLC opinions related to national security were made
public on January 8, 2009 and January 16, 2009). The January 2009 publications included OLC
memoranda from as early as 2001 that dealt with the administration’s conduct in the war on terror, as
well as congressional oversight efforts. See, e.g., Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy
Assistant Att’y Gen., to Counsel to the President (Nov. 6, 2001), available at www.usdoj.gov/olc/
2001/pub-millcommfinal.pdf (made public January 8, 2009).
112. One significant shift in information disclosure is the difference in treatment of requests
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) between the Clinton administration and the Bush
administration. Compare Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to the Heads of all Fed.
Dep’ts and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/011012.htm (stating
that “[w]hen you carefully consider FOIA requests and decide to withhold records, in whole or in
part, you can be assured that the Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless they lack a
sound legal basis”), with Memorandum from Janet Reno, Att’y Gen., to the Heads of Dep’ts and
Agencies (Oct. 4, 1993), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia_updates/Vol_XIV_3/page3.htm
(“The Department [of Justice] will no longer defend an agency’s withholding of information merely
because there is a ‘substantial legal basis’ for doing so. Rather, in determining whether or not to
defend a nondisclosure decision, we will apply a presumption of disclosure.” (citation omitted)).
Congress’s attempts to strengthen FOIA in December 2007, were undermined by the Bush
administration’s efforts to have disputes mediated by the Department of Justice, as opposed to the
less partisan National Archives. See Editorial, The Cult of Secrecy at the White House, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2008, at A30.
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different view.113 Reliance on secret laws—near anathema to the rule of
law—became routine.
The Bush administration’s stance, although subject to considerable
criticism,114 did not violate rules or codified procedures of the OLC.115
The processes for developing and publicizing legal policy within the
OLC, within the Department of Justice, or even within the administration
as a whole have historically operated according to uncodified and
informal customs and cultural norms.116
Although those customs and norms were adhered to by many prior
administrations, the Bush administration chose to alter the processes by
which legal policy is developed and disseminated:117 first, in how the
OLC opinions are used for political purposes;118 second, in whose input
was sought in the development of legal policy;119 and third, in not
sharing the legal opinions with administration actors directly affected by
the opinions.120
This is particularly evident in certain OLC opinions involving issues
of national security and the administration’s conduct in the war on terror.
113. See Sudha Setty, The President’s Question Time: Power, Information, and the Executive
Credibility Gap, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 256–60 (2008) (discussing the lack of
information forthcoming from the Bush administration); Editorial, The President’s Lawyers, WASH.
POST, Mar. 11, 2008, at A18.
114. See Walter E. Dellinger et al., Guidelines for the President’s Legal Advisors, 81 IND. L.J.
1345, 1350–51 (2006) (stating that the OLC should publicly explain any advice contrary to statutory
requirements); Lederman, supra note 80 (“The classification of this memo was entirely
unjustifiable.”).
115. GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 33 (noting that the OLC “is subject to few rules to guide its
actions and has little or no oversight or public accountability”); Johnsen, supra note 6, at 1578–79
(discussing the need for the OLC to adhere to internal guidelines). This lack of mandated disclosure
of OLC memoranda is properly viewed in the context of the statutory requirement to disclose
intelligence programs to congressional intelligence committees. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 413, 413a, 413b
(Supp. IV 2004) (requiring that the President, Director of National Intelligence, or head of relevant
departments keep the congressional intelligence committees “fully and currently informed” of
various intelligence activities).
116. Johnsen, supra note 6, at 1578–79. Although this lack of structure has been the norm
through numerous administrations since the OLC was founded, the significant shift in culture and
the politicization of the OLC under the Bush administration exposed that many of the customary
practices and procedures used by OLC lawyers and the Department of Justice in previous
administrations were not required by any kind of internal or external control. Therefore, the Bush
administration viewed those norms as non-binding and chose not to enforce them. GOLDSMITH,
supra note 8, at 33, 79–80.
117. GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 166–67.
118. See id. at 95–98 (discussing the OLC’s impact in helping to shape policy).
119. Id. at 116 (noting OLC policy limiting readership of controversial opinions to a small group
of lawyers); Johnsen, supra note 6, at 1564.
120. GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 166–67 (noting OLC policy excluded the State Department
from access to the opinions); Johnsen, supra note 6, at 1600 (“OLC apparently either never solicited
or simply ignored the advice of the Department of State and the Criminal Division of the Department
of Justice.”).
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The Bybee Memorandum and Yoo Memorandum authorization of
extremely harsh interrogation techniques is an example of how the
process by which legal policy is developed has changed considerably,
and how external controls are not used to ensure that the legal opinions
being generated reflect the best thinking of individuals familiar with the
relevant areas of law.121
2. Political Pressure on the OLC
Attempts to convince the Bush administration to follow the
precedent set by Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt, which turned on
publicizing the administration’s desired policy position and lobbying for
congressional and public support, were limited and ultimately
unsuccessful.122
The route of Lincoln and Roosevelt was consistently rejected, and
process-oriented secrecy brought additional political pressure to bear on
the OLC. This pressure transformed the OLC into an advocate that “‘lost
its ability to say no’” to the White House,123 a transformation
underscored by those who referred to Yoo as “Dr. Yes” for his
acquiescence to any and all White House requests for legal
justifications.124
Additionally, decisions about hiring, promotion, and resignation in
the OLC appeared to turn on perceptions of loyalty to the administration
and its preferred legal positions. Career lawyers who tried to remain
politically neutral in their legal analyses were ostracized125 or passed

121. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 167–72.
122. Id. at 81–85. Goldsmith recounts that his attempts to restore process controls at the OLC
were rejected by David Addington, counsel to Vice President Dick Cheney and an influential voice
in shaping executive branch legal policy. Id. at 80–82. In another exchange, Goldsmith recalls
offering his opinion to Addington that the Fourth Geneva Convention “applied to all Iraqi civilians,
including terrorists and insurgents.” Rosen, supra note 52, at 43. Addington was “livid” and replied
that the President had made up his mind that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to terrorists, and
then told Goldsmith, “‘[y]ou cannot question his decision.’” Id. Goldsmith left his post after nine
months, due in part to his unwillingness to provide the administration legal comfort for all of its
proposed national security programs. Id.
123. Shane et al., supra note 51 (quoting Douglas Kmiec, head of the OLC under Presidents
Reagan and George H.W. Bush).
124. Id. (referring to then-Attorney General John Ashcroft’s private nickname for John Yoo).
125. James Comey, former Deputy Attorney General, prepared his resignation after then-White
House Chief of Staff Andrew Card and then-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales attempted to
have then-Attorney General John Ashcroft sign off on a memo that claimed that an even more
aggressive version of the administration’s warrantless wiretapping program was legally sound while
Ashcroft was hospitalized and Comey was acting Attorney General. Dan Eggen & Paul Kane,
Gonzales Hospital Episode Detailed, WASH. POST, May 16, 2007, at A1.
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over for promotion,126 while OLC lawyers perceived to be sympathetic to
the White House legal agenda were promoted and supported,127 with the
implication that White House support would be withdrawn if that loyalty
were brought into question.128
Political pressure, combined with OLC opinions shrouded in secrecy
from inception through issuance, undermined the credibility and quality
of legal reasoning found in OLC opinions.129 The lack of self-policing
by the OLC and the administration was compounded by a lack of
significant oversight from supervisors within the Justice Department,130
lawyers from other parts of the administration, and Congress.
For example, Jack Goldsmith notes that prior to his tenure as OLC
head, even National Security Agency lawyers were denied access to
OLC’s legal opinions governing National Security Agency activities.131
This attitude reflected the administration’s view that it had no obligation
to share information with any agency within its own administration, even
when the legal opinion in question directly related to the activities of that
agency.
126. Shane et al., supra note 51 (noting that when Alberto Gonzales sought to fill the vacancy at
the OLC after Goldsmith’s departure, he “informed Daniel Levin, the acting head who had backed
Mr. Goldsmith’s dissents and signed the new opinion renouncing torture, that he would not get the
job”).
127. Id. Steven G. Bradbury, perceived to be sympathetic to the White House’s desire for legal
justification for its preferred course of action, acted as head of the OLC after Levin was advised he
would not be nominated. Bradbury was not, however, immediately nominated to the Senate for
confirmation to the post. Instead, he was put through a probationary period by the White House at
the suggestion of Harriet Miers, then-White House counsel. Id.
128. Id. (citing Charles J. Cooper, head of the OLC under President Reagan, as viewing the
probationary period as problematic from a partiality perspective). Bradbury was later nominated by
President Bush, but was never confirmed as head of the OLC, due in part to administration rejection
of the Senate request for the release of OLC memoranda authored by Bradbury. See Philip Shenon
& Eric Lichtblau, White House Renews Battle Over Lawyer Who Signed Interrogatories, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2008, at A16 (“[The OLC’s] nominations stalled in the Senate because of a dispute
with the Justice Department over its failure to provide Congress with copies of legal opinions on a
variety of terrorism issues.”).
129. Margulies, supra note 32, at 3–4.
130. In the case of the Bybee Memorandum, Jay Bybee signed off on John Yoo’s draft without
making himself an expert in that area of law, or consulting someone who was an expert in national
security, war powers, and humanitarian law. GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 22–23. Then-Attorney
General John Ashcroft did not provide such supervision, and was actually bypassed in the
development of the Bybee Memorandum by virtue of Yoo’s close relationship with top White House
officials. See Rosen, supra note 52, at 43. Commentators have noted that the lack of impartiality
and the overtly political nature of the Bybee Memorandum have compromised its utility and the
integrity of the OLC generally. See Dorf, supra note 97 (“[T]he August 2002 memo can only be
described as a serious departure from longstanding OLC practice. In content and tone, the memo
reads much like a document that an overzealous young associate in a law firm would prepare in
response to a partner’s request for whatever arguments can be concocted to enable the firm’s client
to avoid criminal liability.”).
131. Rosen, supra note 52, at 45.
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Further, lawyers within the administration, including general
counsels of the military, objected strongly to the substance of the Bybee
Memorandum on torture, but their input was not recognized or
considered in the drafting and promulgation of the Memorandum.132 A
lack of such external checks established the environment for the OLC to
become a “hothouse for rogue ideological opinion, protected from the
winds of scrutiny and peer review and other things by the classification
shield.”133
This highly insulated environment not only denigrates the quality of
legal policy, but brings into question whether some OLC attorneys acted
in violation of legal ethical standards.134 Given the significant overhaul
of processes at the OLC, it is unsurprising that administration critics have
called for mandatory disclosure of OLC memoranda.135
IV. IS MANDATORY DISCLOSURE REALLY THE SOLUTION?
Mandatory disclosure of OLC memoranda that articulate executive
branch legal policy and provide legal comfort to administration actors
will increase the quality and integrity of OLC opinions. Further, the
actions of the Bush administration demonstrate that internal practices of
voluntary disclosure are not effective in maintaining transparency and

132. See Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse and Torture of
Detainees Was Thwarted, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32 (discussing the opposition of U.S.
Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora to the policy articulated in the Bybee Memorandum); Josh
White, Military Lawyers Fought Policy on Interrogations, WASH. POST, July 15, 2005, at A1
(quoting an Armed Service official concerned that “JAG objections may have fallen on deaf ears,
and that the policy that emerged may have opened the door to abuses at U.S. detention facilities
around the world”).
133. Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 68 (statement of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse).
134. See Clark, supra note 7, at 471 (“John Yoo and Jay Bybee apparently failed to comply with
their ethical obligations to provide candid legal advice and to adequately inform their client . . . .”);
Margulies, supra note 43, at 644 (“[T]he charged atmosphere of national security advice and
litigation can cast legal ethics as a luxury that the attorneys can ill afford.”); see also Jack M. Balkin
& Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
155, 185 (2006) (“Legal academics have debated whether [lawyers in the OLC] were simply doing
their professional duty by representing their clients, or, on the contrary, were betraying their
professional commitments in the deepest sense.”). The question of professional responsibility in the
OLC continues to be of concern to many scholars. E.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Dean, Yale Law Sch.,
Yale Law School Commencement Remarks (May 26, 2008), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/
documents/pdf/News_&_Events/commencement08KohRemarks.pdf.
135. Dellinger et al., supra note 10, at 1607–08; Neal Katyal, Jack Goldsmith & Jamie Gorelick,
Comments at Conference: A Conversation Regarding the Role of the Justice Department in the War
on Terror (Apr. 10, 2008), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/webcast/eventDetail.cfm?
eventID=539, (comments at minutes 28:00–38:00) (noting that although there may be some legal
objections to mandatory disclosure of OLC memoranda, it would be a sound policy for future
administrations to follow).
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that voluntary practices may not work in future administrations.136
Disclosure should thus be mandated by Congress.137
A. Greater Information Disclosure Increases the Integrity of OLC
Opinions
One effect of nondisclosure is legal memoranda that reflect
underdeveloped legal reasoning, a criticism that has been levied against
previously secret OLC memoranda that were either leaked to the public
or eventually declassified.138 Making disclosure the default standard
encourages self-policing by OLC lawyers. Disclosure would also
generate political and public sentiment regarding legal policies, the same
way that congressional lawmaking and judicial opinions are subject to
public scrutiny.139
Obviously, public outcry could influence an
administration to back away from a controversial policy, as has
apparently occurred in the case of the Bybee and Yoo Memoranda; or, as
in the cases of Lincoln and Roosevelt, publication of legal policy could
serve to garner public and congressional support for controversial
policies.
Although some disclosures were made after the inception of the
surveillance program to certain members of Congress,140 the nature of

136. Some have suggested overhauling the entire structure of the OLC to account for the
political pressure on OLC attorneys. See Katyal, supra note 91, at 2337–38 (“OLC should be
stripped of its adjudicatory role and permitted to function only as an advisor to the administration.”).
137. Such oversight measures are often tied to Congress’s spending power, and are included in
appropriations measures.
E.g., The 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations
Authorization Act, § 202, 28 U.S.C. § 530(D) (2002). For a discussion of challenges surrounding
enforcement of congressionally mandated disclosure see infra Part V.B.
138. See Rosen, supra note 52, at 42 (noting that when he started at the OLC in 2003, Jack
Goldsmith reviewed the Bybee and Yoo Memoranda and found them to be “tenditious, overly broad
and legally flawed”).
139. Courts have long recognized the importance of transparency to ensure the accuracy of
administrative decision-making. E.g., Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Dep’t of Transp., 900 F.2d 369,
375 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated, 498 U.S. 1077 (1991) (“These [notice-and-comment] procedures
reflect Congress’ ‘judgment that . . . informed administrative decision making require[s] that agency
decisions be made only after affording interested persons’ an opportunity to communicate their
views to the agency. Equally important, by mandating ‘openness, explanation, and participatory
democracy’ in the rulemaking process, these procedures assure the legitimacy of administrative
norms.” (citation omitted)); Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir. 1985)
(“The purpose of the notice-and-comment procedure is both ‘to allow the agency to benefit from the
experience and input of the parties who file comments . . . and to see to it that the agency maintains a
flexible and open-minded attitude toward its own rules.’ The notice-and-comment procedure
encourages public participation in the administrative process and educates the agency, thereby
helping to ensure informed agency decisionmaking.” (citation omitted)).
140. See Johnsen, supra note 6, at 1563, 1600–01 (noting that after-the-fact disclosures to
Congress do not help maintain best practices in crafting and implementing policy).
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those communications were such that no benefit of accountability
accrued.141 For example, limited aspects of the warrantless wiretapping
program were disclosed to the “Gang of Eight,” a bipartisan group of
members of Congress.142 However, this information was not a complete
briefing, and the attendees were under the severe restriction of not being
allowed to reveal the information learned in the meetings, including to
members of their staffs or other members of the congressional
intelligence committees.143
If briefing attendees had any objection to the nature of the
surveillance program, their only recourse was to complain to those
providing the briefing, or discreetly communicate with the administration
to voice their objections, with the hope that those objections would be
considered.144
This disclosure becomes meaningless unless the recipients of the
information—here, individuals within Congress—evince the will to
disregard the unreasonable secrecy limitations placed on them by the
administration, or to leverage their power in Congress to exert strong and
meaningful pressure on the administration to change its legal policies.
The public debate triggered by the disclosure would increase the
likelihood that the administration would produce a more effective,
lawful, policy.145 For example, because information recipients were not
able to exercise meaningful oversight or develop a cogent legislative
response to the wiretapping program,146 Congress is still looking for
ways to negotiate the exposure of classified information while still
conducting useful, legitimate oversight of the Department of Justice.147

141. Kitrosser, supra note 5, at 1058–59.
142. Id. at 1058.
143. Id. at 1058–59; Eric Lichtblau & David E. Sanger, Administration Cites War Vote in Spying
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at A1; see also Warrick & Eggen, supra note 82 (highlighting the
restrictions on congressional information recipients in the context of the administration’s use of
waterboarding during the interrogation of detainees).
144. Dan Eggan, Limiting NSA Spying is Inconsistent With Rationale, Critics Say, WASH. POST,
Feb. 8, 2006, at A5; David E. Sanger, In Address, Bush Says He Ordered Domestic Spying, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at A1.
145. See Lederman, supra note 80.
146. Suzanne E. Spaulding, Power Play: Did Bush Roll Past the Legal Stop Signs?, WASH.
POST, Dec. 25, 2005, at B1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senators Left Out of Loop Make Their Pique
Known, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2006, at A20.
147. To that end, Congress passed Senate Bill 274, The Federal Employee Protection Act of
2007, to protect whistleblowers who report abuses in the area of national security to Congress. In
January 2008, Attorney General Mukasey and others objected to such protections based on national
security concerns. Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 22–23 (statement of Sen.
Grassley).
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In response to such criticisms, the Bush administration contended
that briefings to a limited number of congresspeople, even with the
significant restrictions on information flow in place, constituted an
adequate check on executive branch legal policy-making.148
Mandatory disclosure would also force a higher level of self-policing
by the OLC and the administration because of the crucial offensive and
defensive functions served by the memoranda. Offensively, the OLC
memoranda in question lay out an expansive view of presidential power
regarding the legality of certain national security programs.
Defensively, providing legal comfort to protect interrogators and
others against future prosecution is one of the primary reasons for the
existence of certain OLC memoranda.149 CIA agents referred to the
immunity provisions of the Bybee Memorandum as the “Golden Shield”
that protected them from future liability if the interrogation techniques
were ever made public.150 Evidence suggests that CIA interrogators
would not have conducted any “enhanced interrogations” without
specific legal approval,151 and that the Bybee and Yoo Memoranda’s
blanket immunity for those involved in the decision-making on the use of
harsh techniques encouraged top White House officials to continue
asking the CIA to use those techniques.152
Because OLC opinions were essential to convince CIA operatives
that they would not face prosecution or legal liability in the future, it is
highly unlikely that such harsh techniques would ever have been used
without the formal protection of an OLC opinion deeming the actions to
be legal.153 If such memoranda were, as a default, made public, then the
148. Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency’s Surveillance Authority:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 30 (2006) [hereinafter Wartime
Executive Power], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/nsaserv.pdf (statement of
Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States).
149. Mink, supra note 62 (“[Both the Bybee and Yoo Memoranda] provide excuses for
interrogators and their military and civilian supervisors. These amount to variations of ‘I was just
following orders,’ self-defense (of the nation) or necessity (to prevent a greater evil).”).
150. Jan Crawford Greenburg et al., Sources: Top Bush Advisors Approved ‘Enhanced
Interrogation,’ ABCNEWS, Apr. 9, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/LawPolitics/story?id=458
3256; Editorial, There Were Orders to Follow, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2008, at A22 (noting that the
Yoo Memorandum offered a “detailed blueprint for escaping accountability”).
151. See Greenburg et al., supra note 150 (noting efforts to avoid the CIA being painted as a
“rogue agency”).
152. Lara Jakes Jordan & Pamela Hess, Associated Press, Cheney, Others OK’d Harsh
Interrogations, ABCNEWS, Apr. 11, 2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com/politics/wirestory?
id=4631535. Goldsmith describes the defensive role of OLC memoranda as “‘free get-out-of-jail
cards’” being dispensed to the interrogators, and an “‘advance pardon’” for controversial actions.
See Rosen, supra note 52, at 43.
153. See Scott Shane, Nominee’s Stand May Avoid Tangle of Torture Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
1, 2007, at A20 (“[A]ny statement by Mr. Mukasey that waterboarding is torture could fuel criminal
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internal pressure to offer the best possible assessment of whether the use
of harsh techniques is legal would increase dramatically.
B. Nature of the Mandatory Disclosure
A new disclosure requirement should apply to almost all OLC
opinions and result in a timely disclosure to the public whenever
possible.154 Exceptions should be made for limited purposes, including
when a particular administrative agency requests confidentiality and does
not actually rely on the advice given in a particular opinion.155
Such a system would bring the OLC’s disclosure practices into line
with the exceptions to disclosure under the Freedom of Information
Act,156 particularly Exemption No. 5,157 which protects the intra-agency
deliberative process.158
Mandatory disclosure—at least to Congress, if not to the public—for
every OLC opinion that affirms the legality of policies which are then
actually implemented by an administration would create a context in
which legal comfort is available only from those opinions that are made
public.159
This flexible standard would allow for retention of
confidentiality when necessary and when the opinion sought does not
shape actual policy, and would minimize the chilling effect on those
seeking legal advice within an administration.160 Courts have made clear
charges or lawsuits against those responsible for waterboarding.”).
154. Some OLC opinions involving classified information or particularly sensitive national
security matters should not be disclosed to the public, but should be made available to Congress
under the rubric set forth in the National Security Act of 1947. See infra note 197.
155. Compare Dellinger et al., supra note 10, at 4 (“OLC should consider the views regarding
disclosure of the client agency that requested the advice. Ordinarily, OLC should honor a
requestor’s desire to keep confidential any OLC advice that the proposed executive action would be
unlawful, where the requestor then does not take the action.” (emphasis added)).
156. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), (b)(1)–(9) (2006).
157. § 552(b)(5).
158. See, e.g., Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Dep’t of Justice, 411 F.3d 350, 356 (2d Cir. 2005)
(explaining that the deliberative process privilege “is designed to promote the quality of agency
decisions by preserving and encouraging candid discussion between officials”); Tigue v. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, 312 F.3d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that the deliberative process privilege is “a sub
species of work-product privilege that ‘covers documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions
and policies are formulated’” (citing Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532
U.S. 1, 2 (2001))); Bronx Defenders v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, No. 04-CV-8576-HB,
2005 WL 3462725, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2005) (same).
159. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161 (1975) (holding that the
deliberative process privilege ends when an originally deliberative document is adopted or
incorporated by reference into a final agency policy or decision); see also Bronx Defenders, 2005
WL 3462725, at *2 (same).
160. As the Supreme Court reasoned:
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that the administration should not be permitted “to develop a body of
‘secret law,’ used by it . . . but hidden behind a veil of privilege because
it is not designated as ‘formal,’ ‘binding,’ or ‘final.’”161
C. Potential Impact of New OLC Culture on Future Administrations
In times of both war and peace, the OLC’s cultural norm under
previous administrations allowed for some information disclosure and
more internal and external controls; critics agree that this previous norm
is preferable to the lack of process controls and standard practices during
the Bush administration.162
However, it is problematic to assume that internal constraints can be
successfully re-established to maintain impartiality and best practices163
in the OLC if the interaction between the President and Congress
remains highly politicized, as during the Bush administration.164 This is
particularly true if both houses of Congress and the President belong to
the same political party—if Congress does not have the political will to
exercise at least some oversight of the OLC, mandatory disclosure can
and will serve as a backstop.165 Further, politicization and political

[T]he probability that an agency employee will be inhibited from freely advising a
decisionmaker for fear that his advice if adopted, will become public is slight. First, when
adopted, the reasoning becomes that of the agency and becomes its responsibility to
defend . . . . Moreover, the public interest in knowing the reasons for a policy actually
adopted by an agency supports [disclosure].
NLRB, 421 U.S. at 161.
161. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
162. See Johnsen, supra note 6, at 1564 (encouraging a return to old OLC norms and the use of
internal executive branch constraints to maintain those old norms); see also Dellinger et al., supra
note 10.
163. Johnsen, supra note 6, at 1579 (noting that “the power of unwritten tradition alone plainly
is inadequate” to maintain OLC best practices).
164. In rare instances, a minority party in Congress has exerted enough political pressure on
majority leaders to heighten or maintain oversight. One such example is the Senate Intelligence
Committee’s completion of its investigation into the flawed intelligence that was reported in the
National Intelligence Estimate of 2002. See Patricia Wald & Neil Kinkopf, Putting Separation of
Powers into Practice: Reflections on Senator Schumer’s Essay, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 41, 49
(2007) (noting that political parties are more ideologically polarized than in previous eras). The
completion of the Intelligence Committee’s work only occurred after Senate Democrats threatened
to stall business on the Senate floor. See id. at 48.
165. See George C. Edwards III & Andrew Barrett, Presidential Agenda Setting in Congress, in
POLARIZED POLITICS 109, 133 (Jon R. Bond & Richard Fleischer eds., 2000) (“[U]nder unified
government, . . . the majorities in Congress are most likely to defer to the White House’s lead.”);
Setty, supra note 113, at 260 (observing that congressional investigative function is limited in times
of one-party government); Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism,
118 HARV. L. REV. 2673, 2679 (2005) (noting that under unified government, Congress tends to
support the President without questioning the wisdom of his policies).
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pressure166 may be inevitable in times of war.167 Politicization that leads
to self-interested actions, such as keeping secret potentially controversial
legal policies, highlights the need for institutionalized checks and
balances such as mandated disclosure.168
Finally, asking OLC lawyers to revert to a particular model of best
practices is futile if those lawyers already believe that they are adhering
to best practices in terms of their legal analysis.169 John Yoo, Jay Bybee,
and former Attorney General Mukasey made clear that they believed that
the legal opinions drafted by the OLC were done so in good faith and
through the best possible interpretation of the law.170 Goldsmith, a
strong critic of some tactics of the administration, stated that everyone he

166. Oversight Hearing Transcript, at 49–50 (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer) (noting some
changes in Department of Justice process after Michael Mukasey became Attorney General,
including the limitation of contact between White House and Justice Department employees, and
other efforts to lessen political influence in Justice Department decision-making).
167. The examples of Lincoln and Roosevelt illustrate this point. See also Scheppele, supra note
43, at 837 (“The ‘great presidents,’ Lincoln and Roosevelt, played fast and loose with constitutional
rules in the name of civil war and economic emergency.”).
168. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition. . . . It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to
control the abuses of government.”); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties,
Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2313–14 (2006) (“Madison’s account of rivalrous, selfinterested branches is embraced as an accurate depiction of political reality and a firm foundation for
the constitutional law of separation of powers.”); Setty, supra note 113, at 251–52 (“Under the
model of divided government advanced by James Madison, ‘ambition would counteract ambition,’
keeping the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary exercising their proper functions—no more and no
less.”).
169. John Yoo, who drafted at least part of the Bybee Memorandum, maintains that his advice
was not politically motivated, and that it represented an impartial, accurate reading of the law:
[I]t’s very important not to put in an opinion interpreting a law on what you think the
right thing to do is, because I think you don’t want to bias the legal advice with these
other considerations. Otherwise, I think people will question the validity of the legal
advice. They’ll say, “Well, the reason they reached that result is that they had certain
moral views or certain policy goals they wanted to achieve.” And actually I think at the
Justice Department and [the OLC], there’s a long tradition of keeping the law and policy
separate.
Frontline: The Torture Question (PBS television broadcast July 19, 2005) (edited transcript),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/yoo.html.
170. From the Department of Justice to Guantanamo Bay: Administration Lawyers and
Administration Interrogation Rules, Part III: Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights,
and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter
Interrogation Rules] (testimony of John Yoo, Professor of Law, University of California Berkeley
School of Law), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdfs/Yoo080626.pdf (“[W]e in
OLC were determined . . . to interpret the law, in good faith . . . by operating within the bounds
drawn by the laws and the Constitution of the United States. Now as then, I believe we achieved this
goal.”); Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 9 (remarks of Michael Mukasey, Att’y Gen.
of the United States).
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dealt with in the administration “‘thought they were doing the right
thing’” in developing OLC legal opinions.171
A different set of principles and practices in the Obama
administration OLC seems likely given the vigorous support of
transparency by the incoming administration.172 However, without
further external measures to ensure greater information disclosure, the
breakdown of OLC norms during the Bush administration173 could recur
in any future administration.174
The question that remains after all of the hand-wringing over the
politicization of the OLC is whether President Obama and every future
president will re-establish and abide by those OLC norms, in which case
the information disclosure problems highlighted here may not need to be
addressed further. However, President Obama or future presidents may
find it helpful and self-serving to use the George W. Bush administration
as precedent to cement the aggregation of executive power175 and limit
access to OLC legal policy,176 in which case we must consider whether
additional structural or institutional measures will be helpful to improve
the quality of OLC opinions while maintaining the integrity of sensitive
national security programs to which some legal opinions relate.177 As
one administration critic has put it, “[w]hat was once shocking and

171. Rosen, supra note 52, at 42.
172. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, On First Day, Obama Quickly Sets a New Tone, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2009, at A1 (noting how Obama changed rules on information disclosure on his first full day in
office); Eric Lichtblau, Obama Fills Top Justice Department Spots, N. Y. TIMES.COM, Jan. 5, 2009,
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/05/obama-fills-top-justice-department-spots/?scp=1&sq
=1/5/09%20johnsen&st=cse (noting that new OLC head, Dawn Johnsen, was a frequent critic of the
Bush administration OLC practices).
173. Notably, former Attorney General Mukasey has pointed out that no one at the OLC ever
thought that they were promulgating a bad opinion or that they were breaking the law. Oversight
Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 82.
174. New OLC head, Dawn Johnsen, has acknowledged the need for external checks to maintain
the long-term integrity of the OLC. See Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a President to Do? Interpreting
the Constitution in the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395, 396 (2008)
(encouraging Congress to impose external checks on executive branch constitutional interpretation).
175. See Bruce Ackerman, Terrorism and the Constitutional Order, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 475,
478 (2006) (“[W]hatever new powers are conceded to the President in this metaphorical war [on
terror] will be his forever.”).
176. Adam Cohen, Op.-Ed., Honey, They Shrunk the Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007, at
A24 (“The issue of reining in presidential power is beginning to gain traction among
conservatives . . . as they contemplate the possibility of a Democrat . . . as president.”).
177. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 5, at 1050 (“In matters of congressional oversight generally,
it is difficult and important to balance the respective values of information flow to the public,
information flow between Congress and the President, and presidential discretion to act swiftly and
secretly.”).
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unacceptable in America has now been internalized as the new
normal.”178
D. Compensating for a Lack of Checks and Balances
The lack of effective oversight by the courts and Congress enabled
the Bush administration’s unwillingness to disclose OLC opinions.179
This issue is significantly more problematic in times of unified
government—that is, when Congress is aligned politically with the
President, as it was from 2000 to 2006, and as it is now.180 However,
lack of oversight often persists even in divided government during
wartime, when Congress often acquiesces to executive requests with
little opposition.181 As such, additional institutionalized safeguards, such
as mandatory disclosure of opinions, are necessary to offset a lack of
effective oversight.182
Congressional leaders have admitted the failure of Congress to
extract meaningful concessions from the administration in terms of
disclosing legal policy or responding to congressional requests for

178. Frank Rich, Op.-Ed., The Coup at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007; see Sanford
Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699, 705
(2006); Scheppele, supra note 43, at 839.
179. Editorial, Secrets and Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at A18 (citing refusal of the courts
to question seriously any administration claim of state secrets).
180. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 168, at 2371 (citing JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A
WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, 59–75 (1990) (concluding that
congressional committees exercised over twenty-six percent more oversight in times of divided
government than unified government between 1961 and 1977)). Levinson and Pildes used a simple
majority to assess whether a party was able to exert control in the legislature. Id. at 2368–71; see
also Setty, supra note 113, at 260–62 (addressing the limits of Congress’s investigative function).
181. Barron & Lederman, supra note 32, at 999–1000; Katyal, supra note 91, at 2321–22 (“A
Congress that conducts little oversight provides a veneer of legitimacy to an adventurist President.
The President can appeal to the historic sense of checks and balances, even if those checks are
entirely compromised by modern political dynamics. With this system in place, it is no surprise that
recent calls for legislative revitalization have failed.”).
182. When the President looks to leverage his position to gain more power, the legislature is
obliged to exercise oversight to control executive overreaching. See AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 111 (2005) (noting that although Congress’s oversight
function is not specifically enumerated in Article I of the Constitution, it most definitely was an
expectation of the framers of the Constitution that Congress would exercise oversight of the
executive branch, based on the traditional powers exercised by the English parliaments and the
colonial legislatures). See generally Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of
Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307 (2001) (“In its broadest terms, the rule of law
requires that the state only subject the citizenry to publicly promulgated laws, that the state’s
legislative function be separate from the adjudicative function, and that no one within the polity be
above the law.”).
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witnesses and documents that would shed light on administration
activities.183
V. HOW VALID ARE ADMINISTRATION JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
NONDISCLOSURE?
National security interests demand a heightened awareness of how
sensitive information is treated, since the President has legitimate needs
to act quickly and discreetly in times of war. Equally legitimate is the
need for the public and Congress to understand the country’s legal policy
vis-à-vis national security matters.184
The administration justifies its nondisclosure of legal policy in two
ways: first, through pragmatic arguments, namely that national security
concerns demand that the administration strictly limit access to legal
policies and interpretations by the executive branch. Second, the
administration uses the unitary executive theory to claim that the
President can determine unilaterally how the executive branch conducts
war.185 Both of these arguments are not compelling reasons to forego
mandated disclosure.
A. Pragmatic Arguments Justifying Non-Disclosure
Attempts by Congress during the Bush administration to garner
information regarding national security issues met with mixed results,186
depending on the political pressure brought to bear on the Bush
administration and whether underlying documents or information had
already been leaked to Congress. 187
The Bush administration consistently insisted that nondisclosure of
legal policy was necessary to maintain the integrity of U.S. national

183. Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 59–62 (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer).
184. Kitrosser, supra note 5, at 1050.
185. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 356 (1996) (noting that the current debate over
the scope of the executive power during wartime can be traced back to discussions between
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison over President George Washington’s proclamation of
neutrality in 1793).
186. See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Mukasey Asked to Explain Terror Call Remarks, S.F. CHRONICLE,
Apr. 11, 2008 (reporting that the Department of Justice refused a congressional request for
elaboration on the necessity of maintaining a warrantless surveillance program).
187. Attempts by Congress to get information related to intelligence gathering, which are
mandated under the National Security Act of 1947, should be distinguished from covert operations
for the purpose of effecting a military strike against a foreign power, which the President is not
under obligation to disclose to Congress. See 50 U.S.C. § 413(b)(e)(1) (2000).
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security interests.188 The administration often offered the defense that
additional information as to the content of OLC opinions would
empower terrorists planning to attack the United States.189 Former
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales testified that “widespread briefings
would pose an unacceptable risk to the national security.”190
To that end, the Bush administration deviated from the prescribed
procedure for disclosure of sensitive information to Congress laid out in
the National Security Act of 1947.191 Whereas the Act mandates
briefings to an eight-person subset of congressional intelligence
committees for particularly sensitive issues, the Bush administration
limited briefings to four people—the top Republican and Democratic
members of the two committees.192 The reason offered for this deviation
was based on national security concerns—namely that the interrogation
program should stay secret for fear that al-Qaeda operatives might find
out what to expect if captured by the United States.193
Former Attorney General Mukasey used the fact that national
security is the Justice Department’s top priority to support extensive
nondisclosure. For example, when considering the complicity of
telecommunications companies in the Bush administration’s warrantless
wiretapping programs, Mukasey refused a Senate request to discuss the
actual role of the companies, testifying in a January 2008 hearing that it
could compromise national security interests to publicize the “means and
methods” used by the administration.194

188. See Wartime Executive Power, supra note 148, at 264–320; Johnsen, supra note 6, at 1565.
189. Carol D. Leonnig & Eric Rich, U.S. Seeks Silence on CIA Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 4,
2006, at A1; see Wartime Executive Power, supra note 148, at 107 (suggesting such revelations
remind the enemy that they are being monitored); Kitrosser, supra note 5, at 1056 (“[T]he
administration has offered no explanation of the purported dangers of revealing the program’s very
existence beyond the vague assertion that, while terrorists surely already know that the United States
can survey their conversations, knowing about the program would remind them of this fact and
might lead them to infer that surveillance is broader than they had assumed.”); see also Ackerman,
supra note 175, at 478–79 (arguing that the rhetoric surrounding the war on terror encourages a
public and congressional overreaction of ceding powers to the President).
190. Wartime Executive Power, supra note 148, at 137. See id. passim for further pragmatic
arguments in favor of non-disclosure of national security-related legal policy to Congress.
191. 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2000).
192. Warrick & Eggen, supra note 82.
193. Id. Critics have offered a second, perhaps more important reason for the desire for secrecy:
to avoid public and international censure over the use of the harsh interrogation techniques. When
the interrogation program became known more widely in late 2005, the uproar from Congress and
the public apparently prompted the administration to modify its program. Id.
194. See Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 6–7, 15–17. Sen. Orrin Hatch agrees
with Mukasey’s assessment, saying that “the reason for classification is to protect the information
from getting in the hands of the wrong people.” Id. at 47 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch).
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Mukasey also refused to disclose whether and under what possible
circumstances waterboarding could be used lawfully by U.S.
interrogators, because of his fear that such disclosure would embolden
terrorists by letting them know what to expect while imprisoned by the
United States.195
The Bush administration supported this pragmatic argument with the
theory that the President is authorized, without disclosure of the program
to Congress or the public, by the Authorization to Use Military Force
(AUMF) to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, com
mitted, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such nations, organizations or persons.196

The administration has argued that whatever obligation it had to
share information with Congress relating to the development of legal
policy, whether under previous Justice Department norms or the
information-sharing rubric of the National Security Act of 1974,197 was
obviated by the passage of the AUMF.198 The view that the AUMF
provides a blanket justification for whatever action the administration
deems necessary as part of the war on terror was squarely rejected by the
Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.199
Despite the reclassification and release in April 2008 of the Yoo
Memorandum, numerous OLC opinions remained secret for many years,
supposedly for reasons of national security—the same reason offered for
the initial nondisclosure of the Yoo Memorandum, which was eventually
declassified in response to a FOIA request.

195. Id. at 20–21.
196. Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (emphasis added). The AUMF was passed
by Congress one week after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
197. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 413(a), 413a(a)(1), (b) (2000).
198. See Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a); Wartime Executive Power, supra note 148, at 264–320;
President George W. Bush, President’s Radio Address (Dec. 17, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html;.
199. 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
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1. General Critiques of the Pragmatic Justification
The claim that disclosure of legal policies is unnecessary and unwise
because it would jeopardize U.S. national security interests is
questionable, given both the experiences of the United States and other
nations, as well as serious concerns about the maintenance of the rule of
law.
First, the Bush administration offered no credible evidence that
disclosure would harm U.S. national security interests; in fact, it has
offered no evidence that the disclosure of the OLC memoranda that were
initially withheld from public scrutiny—such as the Bybee and Yoo
Memoranda—have negatively impacted U.S. national security programs,
other than the resulting bad publicity and embarrassment for the
administration. Repeated claims of a need for secrecy based on national
security concerns followed by the eventual disclosure of those very OLC
opinions ultimately undermined the Bush administration’s claim, with
more evidence pointing to secrecy being maintained primarily for
partisan purposes or because of an unmitigated belief in the unitary
executive theory.200
Further, the Bush administration failed to make its case as to why
legal policies governing the war on terror must be afforded more secrecy
than domestic criminal laws and procedural rules.201 If the United States
or any democratic nation chooses to rely on secret laws and thus deviate
so substantially from the general edicts of the rule of law, the public
deserves a credible and clear explanation as to why that deviation is
necessary.
2. Critiques from a Comparative Perspective: Greater Transparency of
Legal Policy Is the Norm
Other countries that face serious national security issues have no
mechanism or allowance for secret legal policies to govern national
security matters; instead, several nations publicize, disseminate, and
publicly debate the same type of legal policy that is being withheld from
200. Editorial, Politics, Pure and Cynical, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at A22.
201. Senators involved in administration oversight have noted that domestic criminals are
entitled to understand criminal laws and their related punishments; this serves to uphold the rule of
law and does not appear to undermine the integrity of the criminal justice system. The
administration, however, views the context of national security as fundamentally different than the
domestic criminal context and, therefore, not prone to the same conclusions or restrictions as
domestic criminal law. Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 42–45 (colloquy between
Sen. Russell Feingold and Attorney General Michael Mukasey).
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public scrutiny by the OLC.202 A comparative perspective, even of
nations with significantly different governmental structures,203 provides
some context to evaluate the Bush administration’s pragmatic
justification for non-disclosure.
a. India
India has been coping with serious national security concerns, both
internal and external, for the last sixty years.204 By some accounts, India
has faced a higher number of terrorist acts in recent years than any other
nation.205
The similarities to the U.S. national security landscape are
noteworthy. The central government of India has the responsibility to
develop laws and policies to preserve the national security of India,206
and the country goes through periods of conflict in which its otherwise
supposedly impartial and unbiased legal policy becomes politicized and
prone to government overreaching in the areas of civil rights and civil
liberties.207
202. Kim Lane Scheppele, We Are All Post-9/11 Now, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 609 (2006)
(citing BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF
TERRORISM (2006)) (noting the value of considering other countries’ experiences with balancing
national security with other constitutional interests).
203. Even countries with similar structural arrangements to the United States have different
balances of power with regard to the authorization of wartime actions. For example, Article 29 of
the Mexican Constitution requires congressional approval for emergency measures if Congress is in
session at the time. If Congress is not in session, it must be convened as soon as possible to make a
decision on emergency measures. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos
[Const.], as amended, art. 29, Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
This grant of congressional oversight into questions of the legality of proposed measures is
particularly striking considering the historic strength of the Mexican presidency. See Jeffrey Weldon,
Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico, in PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN
AMERICA 225 (Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Sobert Shugart eds., 1997). Although the Mexican
Constitution of 1917 is structured similarly to the U.S. Constitution, Mexican politics has shaped the
federal government into one that, until the mid-1990s, was a one-party system in which the President
could set his own agenda, likely to be rubber-stamped by the Congress and the courts. Martinez,
supra note 88, at 2508; see also Kenneth F. Johnson, Mexico’s Authoritarian Presidency, in
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS 33, 49 (Thomas V. DiBacco ed., 1977)
(discussing “near-absolute decision-making power that has accrued to the president”).
204. See Anil Kalhan et al., Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism, and Security Laws
in India, 20 COLUM. J. OF ASIAN L. 93, 99 (2006).
205. E.g., Arun Venugopal, India Worst Hit by Terrorism in 2004, INDIA ABROAD, Aug. 19,
2005, at A14.
206. INDIA CONST. art. 246, § I, cl. 1–2A; id. art. 246, § III, cl. 1–2.
207. For example, the Defence of India Act of 1962 authorized the central and state governments
to broaden their use of preventative detention beyond ordinary laws as a means to quell potential
uprisings against the government in response to hostilities in the Jammu and Kashmir region. See
Kalhan et al., supra note 204, at 132–33 (citing VENKAT IYER, STATES OF EMERGENCY: THE INDIAN
EXPERIENCE 109 (2000)).
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India passed a number of strong antiterrorism laws in recent years
which grant additional authority and power to the central government to
maintain national security. In the wake of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks and attacks on Indian government buildings soon
afterward,208 the Indian Parliament enacted the Prevention of Terrorism
Act, 2002 (POTA).209 Under POTA, the government, in conducting
antiterrorist activities and in case of a self-determined emergency, was
authorized to set aside ordinary legal protections with regard to
wiretapping any person within India without authorization,210 extend the
duration and scope of preventative detention measures,211 and deny
arrested suspects access to counsel during the interrogation period.212
Some antiterrorist activities legally authorized under POTA parallel what
was initially authorized under the USA PATRIOT Act213—particularly in
terms of allowing for enhanced surveillance of U.S. citizens214 and
increasing authority for other intelligence-gathering efforts.215
However, major structural differences exist as to how a
parliamentary nation such as India handles the creation of legal policy
related to national security measures: one primary difference is that the
responsibility for the creation of legal policy is diffuse, with the
parliament having the ultimate ability to set the law, while the prime
minister and administrative departments play a central, but not decisive,
role.
For example, an early iteration of some of the POTA policies was a
2000 report216 drafted by the Indian Law Commission,217 a nonpartisan
208. The Indian parliament building in New Delhi was attacked in December 2001, with twelve
people killed and twenty-two injured in an exchange of gunfire. On This Day: Suicide Attack on
Indian Parliament, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Dec. 13, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/
stories/december/13/newsid_3695000/3695057.stm.
209. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 15 of 2002, available at http://indiacode.nic.in.
Enacted March 28, 2002, this Act replaced the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance of 2001.
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001, No. 9 of 2001, available at http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/india/document/actandordinances/POTO.htm.
210. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 15 of 2002, supra note 209, § 43. The admissibility
of evidence garnered in this manner is established in § 45.
211. Id. § 49.
212. Id. § 52.
213. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 [hereinafter PATRIOT Act]
(codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
214. See id. § 218 (amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 such that
electronic surveillance and physical searches need only be justified in “significant” part by the goal
of obtaining foreign intelligence).
215. Id. § 901.
216. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, 173RD REPORT ON PREVENTION OF TERRORISM BILL,
Annxure II §§ 30, 33 (2000), available at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/tada.htm (containing

616

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

commission of respected lawyers and jurists who respond to government
requests for legal recommendations. The 2000 report contained
recommendations that the parliament strengthen the central
government’s power to conduct antiterrorism operations, primarily in
light of ongoing domestic unrest that could provoke a national crisis.218
The Law Commission, in accordance with its own policies, circulated the
report to the public for review and comments.219
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Indian parliament
began debate on whether to pass the Law Commission’s
recommendations from the 2000 report into law.220 In the meantime,
because of the perceived immediacy of the need for the intelligencegathering tools outlined in the Law Commission’s report, the executive
branch issued the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance of 2001, a
temporary ordinance which put into place the recommended tools.221
POTA was enacted in March 2002, containing the same provisions that
were in the temporary ordinance.222
POTA was met with a great deal of opposition from human rights
advocates and opposing political parties, even prior to its enactment.223
In response, the Home Minister of India claimed that opponents to the
measure were assisting the terrorists,224 rhetoric that mirrors the public
provisions similar to those found in POTA regarding the extension at preventative detention and
arrested suspects’ entitlement to legal counsel).
217. The Law Commission is a non-partisan group of lawyers and judges commissioned by the
central government to offer advice and proposals for legal reform. See Law Commission of India,
http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/welcome.html (follow “How Does the Commission
Function?” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 7, 2008).
218. See LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 216 ch. II (describing unrest in Jammu &
Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, and other regions of India).
219. See Law Commission of India, supra note 217 (“[Proposed reforms are] sent out for
circulation in the public and concerned interest groups with a view to eliciting reactions and
suggestions. Usually a carefully prepared questionnaire is also sent with the document. The Law
Commission has been anxious to ensure that the widest section of people [is] consulted in
formulating proposals for law reforms. In this process, partnerships are established with
professional bodies and academic institutions. Seminars and workshops are organised in different
parts of the country to elicit critical opinion on proposed strategies for reform.”).
220. See C. Raj Kumar, Human Rights Implications of National Security Laws in India:
Combating Terrorism While Preserving Civil Liberties, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 195, 195–96
(2005) (“The September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington D.C., and the December 13,
2001 attack on the Indian Parliament have intensified the debate regarding the necessity of
formulating national security laws in India . . . .”).
221. The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, No. 9 of 2001, supra note 209. Under the Indian
Constitution, the executive branch has the power to issue ordinances for a short duration to meet
unforeseen or urgent challenges to the nation. INDIA CONST. art. 123, § 1. See generally M.P. JAIN,
INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2003) (photo. reprint 2007).
222. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 15 of 2002, supra note 209.
223. Kumar, supra note 220, at 196.
224. Kalhan et al., supra note 204, at 152.
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discourse within the United States in response to the PATRIOT Act, as
well as the legal policy developed by the U.S. executive branch.
POTA became a driving issue in the 2004 parliamentary election.
The Congress Party, then a minority party, ran on the promise to repeal
POTA because of the law’s enabling of abuses of human rights and civil
liberties.225 When the Congress Party won the 2004 parliamentary
elections, POTA was repealed almost immediately.226
No secret law exists in terms of Indian antiterrorism policies; instead,
they are generated with a significant level of publicity and public
accountability.227 This publicity led to public and parliamentary support
for POTA in 2002; that same publicity and public accounting led to the
repeal of the Act in 2004. The content of antiterror policies is likely a
reflection of the law, politics, culture, and history of a nation.
Transparency and public accountability, however, demonstrate that
nations are able to maintain national security programs without operating
under undue secrecy.228
b. Israel
Israel has dealt with serious national security issues since its
founding in 1948, with scores of people dying each year in various types
of attacks, including suicide bombings, car bombs, and kidnappings.229
Israel’s antiterrorism efforts, including the techniques used by
Israel’s General Security Service in interrogating detainees suspected of
terrorist activities, are authorized broadly by Article 2(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Statute and the government’s general and residual powers
under Article 40 of the Basic Law (Government).230

225. Id. at 152, 190.
226. The Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Act, No. 26 of 2004, available at http://indiacode.
nic.in/.
227. See also The Right to Information Act, No. 22 of 2005, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/.
(containing provisions similar to FOIA, including an exemption for a deliberative privilege, but not
for adopted policies).
228. Although a number of acts of terrorism have occurred in India in the last several years, no
credible argument has been made that the publication of India’s legal policies surrounding national
security is one of the bases for those attacks.
229. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817, ¶ 1
(“The State of Israel has been engaged in an unceasing struggle for both its very existence and
security, from the day of its founding.”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and Balances in Wartime:
American, British and Israeli Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1906, 1918–19 (2004).
230. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817, ¶ 15.
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The legal treatment of specific interrogation techniques used by the
General Security Services is fundamentally different than how OLC
memoranda treat the same issue. The authority of the General Security
Service to employ certain interrogation techniques was examined by the
Israeli Commission of Inquiry,231 which concluded in 1995 that the
General Security Service had the authority to interrogate suspects using
some physical techniques,232 and established the availability of a post
factum defense of “necessity” for interrogators who engaged in what
would otherwise be considered criminal actions.233
The General Security Service interpreted the necessity defense
broadly; like the Bybee and Yoo Memoranda, the necessity defense was
interpreted internally such that interrogators were given broad legal
comfort that they could not be prosecuted for torturing terrorism suspects
so long as they were doing so in an effort to preserve national security.234
But unlike the Bybee and Yoo Memoranda, this interpretation of the
necessity defense was not kept secret from the public, courts, or the
detainees themselves.
In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of
Israel,235 human rights groups and individual detainees challenged the
blanket reading of the necessity defense based on rule of law and human
rights concerns. The court—with some reservations given Israel’s
national security issues—unanimously held that broad legal comfort to
protect interrogators who torture suspects236 was unacceptable under
Israeli Basic Law.237
231. The Commission of Inquiry, which undertakes investigations of government actions, was
convened under the authority of the Commission of Inquiry Statute (1968). Id. ¶ 16.
232. The techniques at issue included harsh shaking, which, in one instance, led to the death of
the detainee; prolonged detention in stress positions; exposure to extreme temperatures; and covering
the detainee’s head with a vomit-covered hood. Id. ¶¶ 8–13.
233. Id. ¶¶ 2, 15, 19.
234. Id. ¶¶ 8, 15–17.
235. Id.
236. The Israeli Penal Code (1977) prohibits the use of force or violence against a person for the
purpose of extorting from him a confession to an offense or information relating to an offense.
Further, Israel has signed and ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
237. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817. The
court struggled with several national priorities:
We are aware that this decision does not ease dealing with that harsh reality [of Israel’s
security issues]. This is the destiny of democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it,
and not all practices employed by its enemies are open before it. Although a democracy
must often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand.
Preserving the Rule of Law and recognition of an individual’s liberty constitutes an
important component in its understanding of security.
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The High Court, however, affirmed the availability of a necessity
defense for individual interrogators being prosecuted for using such
techniques during a perceived national security emergency, but rejected
the argument put forth by the Israeli government, which parallels the
Bybee and Yoo Memoranda, that blanket immunity ought to apply to the
interrogators’ actions.238
The Public Committee Against Torture decision illustrates how Israel
navigated the tension between adhering to the rule of law and
maximizing national security efforts, particularly with respect to making
public the legal policies and parameters under which the General
Security Service interrogators were acting. As in the case of India,
Israel’s legal policy vis-à-vis national security is developed by numerous
bodies,239 justiciable,240 and open to public scrutiny.241
c. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has dealt with significant internal and external
threats to national security for many decades. A central influence on the
Id. ¶ 39; see also Israel Supreme Court Bans Interrogation Abuse of Palestinians, CNN.COM, Sept.
6, 1999, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/meast/9909/06/israel.torture (“Setting a landmark in Israel’s
decades-old conflict between democracy and security, between respecting human rights and
protecting citizens from terrorism, the Supreme Court on Monday banned the use of torture in
investigations.”).
238. HCJ 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817, ¶ 38.
239. Decisions of the Israeli Attorney General in terms of legal policy or prosecution of the law,
are judicially reviewable. See HCJ 935/89 Ganor v. Attorney General, 44(2) P.D. 485. The Israeli
Supreme Court stated:
In a country ruled by law, where the rule of law governs, there is no justification for
using special criteria to assess the validity of the discretion of the person who heads the
public prosecution service. Note that this conclusion does not mean replacing the
discretion of the Attorney General with the discretion of the court. This conclusion does
not mean invalidating a “wrong” decision of the Attorney General—that is, one in which
he chooses an undesirable but lawful decision. This conclusion means only that all
governmental actors are equal in the eyes of the law.
Id.
240. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 153 (2002) (noting that any complaint against the executive
branch and its actions is considered justiciable by the Israeli Supreme Court, regardless of the
standing of the complainant); see also Schulhofer, supra note 229, at 1923 (noting that the Israeli
Supreme Court “dismantled various doctrinal barriers to judicial review, such as standing and
justiciability” in the 1990s). Schulhofer also notes that Israeli government and military leaders seem
to accept the judicial safeguards that have been put into place to modify the conduct of the
administration. Id. at 1931.
241. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg lauded the Israeli decision in 2007, noting that “courts in
Israel have adhered to basic fairness and due process even dealing with people who would terminate
the existence of the state of Israel.” Jonathan Ringel, Ginsburg Notes Israel Judges’ Ban on Torture,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Oct. 23, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=119304381
9114.
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development of the UK’s modern national security regime was the
violent conflicts in Northern Ireland, known as “The Troubles,” which
escalated in the late 1960s242 and were largely resolved only in 1998 with
the signing of the Belfast Agreement.243 During The Troubles, almost
3000 people were killed and over 30,000 were seriously injured.244
More recently, the United Kingdom has been confronted with
international terrorist threats, including an attack on the London mass
transit system in July 2005 which killed 56 people including the
attackers, and injured over 700 others.245
UK law has vacillated in terms of trying to maintain a balance
among the interests of national security, civil rights and liberties, and the
rule of law. Complicating matters is that the United Kingdom is under
the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and
that detainees have the right to appeal domestic legislation and judicial
decisions to the ECHR.246
As in India, Israel, and the United States, the British Prime Minister
is endowed with war-making power as a legacy of a historical Crown
prerogative;247 nevertheless, he or she almost always seeks authorization
of Parliament to act.248 Additionally, UK law and constitutional norms
require that emergency powers be exercised in a legal framework
involving Parliament and the courts,249 a striking contrast to the Bush
administration’s vision of wartime decision-making as solely within the
purview of the President. 250

242. PETER TAYLOR, LOYALISTS: WAR AND PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND 59–60 (1999).
243. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, reprinted in 37 INT’L
LEGAL MATERIALS 751 (1998).
244. Schulhofer, supra note 229, at 1933.
245. REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BOMBINGS IN LONDON ON 7 JULY 2005, 2006,
H.C. 1087, at 2.
246. Schulhofer, supra note 229, at 1943.
247. PAUL BOWERS, PARLIAMENT AND THE USE OF FORCE (2003), available at http://
www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/snia-01218.pdf.
248. Martinez, supra note 88, at 2491. Prime Minister Tony Blair attempted to thwart
parliamentary efforts to require parliamentary permission before the Prime Minister could engage in
any military actions. Matthew Tempest, Government Kills Short’s War Bill, GUARDIAN, Oct. 21,
2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/oct/21/iraq.iraq.
249. Martinez, supra note 88, at 2499 (addressing the cooperation among the Prime Minister,
Parliament and the judicial system in dealing with the ramifications of an emergency situation); see
CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN
DEMOCRACIES 185–89 (1948).
250. See A (FC) & Others (FC) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2005] UKHL 71, [12]
(noting that although the Crown had historically used torture without legislative or judicial
permission, such powers were rejected with the move toward parliamentary supremacy in the late
1600s); Martinez, supra note 88, at 2495.
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The Prime Minister exerts significant control over the parliament by
virtue of being able to set the legislative agenda for the House of
Commons, and his or her power is commensurate with his or her ability
to exercise discipline over Members of Parliament from the same
party.251
The mandatory involvement of the legislature252 has ensured that
executive branch legal policy does not unilaterally determine how
national security interests are going to be balanced with constitutional
constraints. Instead, the role of Parliament has forced the Prime Minister
to pass legislation in order to deal with particular situations in the war on
terror;253 for example, in November 2005, former Prime Minister Tony
Blair was unable to pass legislation that would allow the government to
detain terrorism suspects for up to ninety days without being charged
because the House of Commons, led by Blair’s own Labour Party, voted
down the proposed legislation.254
Further, the judicial check on executive exercise of national security
powers is a robust one: judicial review is available for all national
security-related legal policy, even in times of war, and including the
treatment of individual detainees.255 The 2004 decision of A v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department,256 illustrated that British courts will
act decisively to counteract national security laws—in that case, the
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001 Part IV—if they deem it
to be disproportionate and discriminatory under ECHR standards.257
251. See Martinez, supra note 88, at 2489; Poguntke & Webb, supra note 88, at 26, 32–33.
252. Canada has followed international best practices in establishing an even more powerful
legislative oversight mechanism in order to increase accountability: the creation of a National
Security Committee of Parliamentarians that would have full access to classified national security
information. See Kent Roach, Must We Trade Rights for Security? The Choice Between Smart,
Harsh, or Proportionate Security Strategies in Canada and Britain, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2151,
2169–70 (noting that in April 2005, the Canadian government accepted that such a committee should
review the “‘ability of departments and agencies engaged in security and intelligence activities to
fulfill their responsibilities,’ including identifying ‘required ongoing improvements to the
effectiveness of Canada’s national security system’” (quoting Press Release, Office of the Deputy
Prime Minister & Minister of Pub. Safety & Emergency Preparedness, Model for National Security
Committee of Parliamentarians (Apr. 4, 2005), available at http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/media/
nr/2005/nr20050404-1-en.asp)).
253. Schulhofer, supra note 229, at 1936–39 (noting Parliament’s central role in developing
legal policy on national security matters).
254. See Martinez, supra note 88, at 2499; Ed Johnson, Great Britain: Parliament Rejects
Crucial Blair Antiterrorism Bill, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 10, 2005, at A15.
255. See Schulhofer, supra note 229, at 1940–43; see also Roach, supra note 252, at 2171.
256. [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68.
257. See Alexandra Chirinos, Finding the Balance Between Liberty and Security: The Lords’
Decision on Britain’s Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 265, 267 (2005) (noting the
legislation in question had been reviewed and criticized by Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human
Rights and the Privy Counsellor Review Committee prior to being heard in court).
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Finally, UK accountability on national security law and policy is
bolstered by a series of independent reviews in which a member of the
House of Lords was granted the necessary security clearance and a
mandate to make independent reports on the operation of the Terrorism
Act, 2000, and the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005.258
Of course, valid questions exist as to the overall effectiveness of the
national security policies in these countries as compared to U.S.
policies,259 and there is always the possibility that despite our belief—
through court decisions, governmental statements, and legislative
oversight—that nations are adhering to the rule of law, those nations
might be secretly developing contrary national security policies.
However, if such secret policy exists in other countries, there is no
indication that those policies would provide legal comfort against future
prosecution. Even this limited overview of the antiterror legal rubric in
three nations facing significant threats to national security suggests that
in terms of process, transparency, and accountability to safeguard civil
rights, the reliance in the United States on secret law might be
singular.260
B. Unitary Executive Theory Justifying Non-Disclosure
The second prong261 of the administration’s justification turns on a
unilateralist reading262 of the unitary executive theory: the theory, evident
258. Roach, supra note 252, at 2171 (noting the need for such a measure to ensure against
“[w]idespread public suspicion about national security activities [that] could eventually compromise
the effectiveness of security activities”).
259. E.g., Somini Sengupta, Terrorist Attacks Unsettling India, N.Y. TIMES.COM, July 29, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/world/asia/29india.html?hp (reporting on the number of Indian
fatalities due to terrorism in recent years); Emily Wax, Organized Blasts Hit Tech Hub of India,
WASH. POST.COM, July 25, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/
25/AR2008072501191.html?hpid=topnews (noting fatal bombings in the cities of Jaipur and
Bangalore in 2008).
260. Many valid objections based on human rights grounds have been levied against the
substance of the antiterrorism policies in India, Israel, and the United Kingdom, but are beyond the
scope of this paper.
261. The administration has also, on occasion, put forth a secrecy justification based on attorneyclient privilege. Interrogation Rules, supra note 170 (“As an attorney I am bound to honor the
confidential and privileged nature of my work for the Department of Justice . . . .”); Jordan & Hess,
supra note 152 (discussing Attorney General Mukasey’s refusal to disclose a 2001 OLC
memorandum on interrogation techniques based on attorney-client privilege).
262. Yoo and Addington promoted a unilateralist reading. See supra note 122 and accom
panying text. This reading is distinguishable from a more modest reading of the unitary executive
theory, which argues the unconstitutionality of insulating administrative departments from the
President’s control, based on the President’s removal power. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, New
Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1068–70 (2006) (arguing that the
President’s inherent executive power allows him to have control over all executive branch
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in numerous OLC memoranda issued during the Bush administration,
that the President alone has the authority to decide how the
administration will fulfill its constitutional obligations.263 This view is
particularly evident in the Bybee and Yoo Memoranda, which
specifically exclude Congress or any other group outside of the
administration from influencing the President’s decision-making on
national security matters: “Congress may no more regulate the
President’s ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it
may regulate his ability to direct troop movements on the battlefield.”264
Numerous presidential signing statements further illustrate the
administration’s rejection of the authority of Congress to influence—let
alone regulate—the parameters of the war on terror, and the
administration’s belief that Congress has no constitutional right even to
understand the details of executive branch legal policy.265 The signing
statements issued by the Bush administration often evidence the intent to
fundamentally change the nature of the legislation itself, particularly with
regard to what information related to antiterror activity Congress is
entitled.266 Notably, many of the signing statements issued by President
George W. Bush object to certain provisions of the legislation based on
the multiple grounds of unitary executive theory, national security, and
separation of powers more generally.267
subordinates, including the Attorney General); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986)
(affirming President’s unilateral removal power); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–64
(1926) (same). But see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (affirming the constitutionality of
the independent counsel statute despite the lack of presidential control over the independent
counsel).
263. See, e.g., Bybee Memorandum, supra note 55; Yoo Memorandum, supra note 69.
Although several of these memoranda deal with U.S. conduct on national security issues, their scope
may allow for purely domestic application in a non-national security context as well. See
GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 97 (recalling that Yoo asserted that all military power vests in the
President, a derivation of executive power from the Crown prerogative of the English monarchs);
Balkin & Levinson, supra note 4, at 499–500; see also James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S.
Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
264. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 55, at 35.
265. Cohen, supra note 176 (noting that the Government Accountability Office issued a report
concluding that in nearly one-third of the cases it examined, after President Bush issued a signing
statement, his administration did not implement the legislation as written).
266. E.g., Presidential Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2002, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1834 (Dec. 28, 2001) (stating that the legislated requirement
that the President, under the rubric of the National Security Act of 1974, report in writing to
congressional intelligence committees violated the President’s constitutional authority to act in a
way to protect foreign relations or national security).
267. E.g., Presidential Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution 2003,
39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 225 (Feb. 20, 2003) (objecting to numerous provisions based on
unitary executive, national security, and separation of powers grounds); Presidential Statement on
Signing the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 38 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1971 (Nov. 4, 2002) (objecting to numerous provisions based on unitary
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When national security concerns are peeled away, a continued and
consistent priority of the Bush administration268 appears to have been to
leverage the power that comes with having a complete understanding of
U.S. national security policy, when Congress—tasked with oversight of
the executive branch—patently does not.269
The Bush administration’s reliance on textual arguments270 based in
the Commander-in-Chief Clause and the Vesting Clause271 of the
Constitution that the Executive branch alone has jurisdiction over warrelated decisions is subject to numerous critiques.272
First, there is little evidence that the framers of the Constitution
concurred with each other as to the nature and extent of an inherent
executive power.273
The framers of the Constitution and early
administrations illustrate an emphasis on pragmatic approaches to powersharing; this is particularly true with regard to the Attorney General, an
office adopted from the British and state colonial governments, whose
executive, national security, and separation of powers grounds); Presidential Statement on Signing
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 38 WEEKLY COM. PRES. DOC. 1658 (Sept. 29, 2002)
(same). See generally Neil Kinkopf & Peter Shane, Am. Constitution Soc’y for Law & Policy, Index
of Presidential Signing Statements: 2001–2007 (2007), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/
Signing%20Statement%20Chart%20-%20Neil%20Kinkopf%20and%20Peter%20Shane.pdf
(supplementing the signing statements and indexing according to statute name, provision objected to,
and reason for objection).
268. Although many administration critics believed that Attorney General Mukasey would
represent a softening of the administration’s reliance on unitary executive theory, Mukasey himself
has relied on it. See Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 37 (describing Mukasey’s
refusal to discuss the legality of the U.S. interrogation program with the Senate due to the fact that
the Senate’s questions were inappropriate and unanswerable on separation of powers grounds); see
also id. at 19 (describing Mukasey’s acknowledgment that the administration’s objection to the
whistleblower provisions in S. 274 were not based on concerns about national security issues, but
rather on the right of the President to operate in a manner unfettered by Congress on national
security matters).
269. See MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 43–46, 112–13 (1994); Kitrosser, supra note 5, at 1050, 1058–59,
1065; Peter M. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge: Administrative Responses to Congressional
Demands for Information, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 199–200 (1992).
270. See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996) (making a textualist argument that
courts have no role in national security matters and that Congress’s role is limited to its spending
power and the impeachment process).
271. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
272. See, e.g., Wartime Executive Power, supra note 148 (citing The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 635, 668 (1803) (arguing that the President has whatever authority is necessary to fulfill the
“solemn duty” of national security)); Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power
Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 688 (2004) (describing lack of historical
basis for inherent executive power argument); Johnsen, supra note 6, at 1560.
273. Compare RAKOVE, supra note 185, at 244–87 (describing debates about executive power at
time of ratification) with Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for
Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179 (2006) (arguing for
more deference to be given to executive interpretations of foreign affairs laws).
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goal is to provide counsel to both the President and Congress.274 Even if
the framers of the Constitution did agree on these points when the
Constitution was being drafted, the Department of Justice—established
following the Civil War as a means for the federal government to enforce
the post-Civil War constitutional amendments275—did not exist when the
Constitution was drafted, thus making an Article II defense of Justice
Department activities weak and convoluted.
Second, the framers expressed a tremendous interest in establishing a
system of checks and balances to counteract any one branch maintaining
a concentration of power.276 Even Alexander Hamilton, a framer of the
Constitution and an ardent proponent of presidential power, noted that in
a republican government, the President would have to defer to the
legislative will much of the time.277 Hamilton also argued that ease of
oversight was one of the benefits of an executive branch headed by an
individual President, who “will be more narrowly watched and more
readily suspected.”278
Third, this unilateralist unitary executive theory inappropriately
discounts Congress’s constitutionally granted war powers, including
Congress’s right to regulate captures during war,279 and Congress’s
ability to exercise oversight of the Executive,280 even with regard to
matters of national security.281
Further, it ignores the structure set discussed by Justice Jackson in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,282 which acknowledges
Congress’s role in oversight, including oversight in the areas of

274. BAKER, supra note 6, at 37–38.
275. RAKOVE, supra note 185, at 344–56.
276. E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (arguing that the checks and balances
among the branches of government are such that “[a]mbition [would] counteract ambition”).
277. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Setty, supra note 113, at 281–87
(discussing the expectations of the framers of the Constitution regarding executive and legislative
power dynamics).
278. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
279. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
280. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. The congressional obligation to conduct oversight of the
executive branch is an implied constitutional power, and has been recognized and affirmed by the
U.S. Supreme Court on numerous occasions. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187
(1957) (“[The] power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.
That power is broad.”); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (stating that “the power of
inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function”).
281. Barron & Lederman, supra note 32, at 691–92 (noting that “there is surprisingly little
historical evidence supporting the notion that the conduct of military campaigns is beyond legislative
control”).
282. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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intelligence and national security.283 Justice Jackson noted that unilateral
executive power is at its “lowest ebb” when the President “takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress.”284 This assessment of presidential power is long-standing and
consistent; from the earliest years of U.S. history, courts have rejected
the notion that the President can ignore duly enacted statutes.285
A unitary executive theory that holds that executive branch
interpretation of the Constitution has primacy over the interpretations
made by the Judiciary and Congress lacks historical and legal bases.286
In earlier administrations—both Republican and Democratic—the OLC
consistently found that the President must subordinate his actions to duly
enacted statutes.287
Fourth, Congress has mandated disclosure of executive branch
decision-making in other contexts. Provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act and the Freedom of Information Act make clear that an
administration cannot conduct itself according to a system of “secret
law.”288 Regarding the FOIA requirements, the Court in NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. made clear when mandating disclosure:
[I]ndexing of “final opinions,” “statements of policy and interpretations
which have been adopted by the agency,” and “instructions to staff that
affect a member of the public,” represents a strong congressional
aversion to “secret (agency) law,” and represents an affirmative
congressional purpose to require disclosure of documents which have
“the force and effect of law.”289

Nonetheless, a President who subscribes to a robust view of the
unitary executive theory may dispute legislative efforts to mandate
disclosure of executive branch legal policy.290 This dispute may manifest
283. Id. at 634–55 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note
7, at 5 (remarks of Sen. Arlen Specter).
284. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
285. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 170 (1804); see also Interrogation Rules, Schroeder
Statement, supra note 58, at 5;
286. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703–07 (1974); Powell, supra note 50, at 1315
(arguing that executive branch avoidance should never be used in the context of the separation of
powers or when dealing with the President’s powers under the Commander-in-Chief Clause);
Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws; President Cites Powers of His Office, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at A1; see also Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 15 (describing
Attorney General Mukasey’s acknowledgement of the history of executive avoidance of Congress’s
oversight).
287. Interrogation Rules, Schroeder Statement, supra note 58, at 4–5.
288. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2007).
289. 421 U.S. 132, 153 (1975) (citations omitted).
290. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 4, at 499 (“The OLC, and the DOJ more generally, have
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itself in a refusal to comply with the legislated disclosure requirements
based on the theory of constitutional avoidance.291
If Congress attempts to mandate information disclosure related to
national security, the President may choose to “avoid” a potential
constitutional conflict between the Article I powers of Congress and the
Article II powers of the President, thus refusing to enforce legislation
mandating the sharing of information.292 Congress took limited steps in
late 2008 to engage in meaningful oversight of the OLC by introducing
legislation that would mandate disclosure of those OLC opinions in
which avoidance is used as a basis for non-compliance with a statutory
provision or treaty obligation.293
been crucial in creating and providing constitutional interpretations justifying the President’s robust
assertions of Article II power to disregard congressional statutes that he believes hamper his inherent
authority as Commander-in-Chief.”). It is also questionable whether such a check would be
effective in practice, considering the historical pattern of Congress not exercising its oversight
function during wartime. The passage by Congress of the Military Commissions Act of 2006
illustrates Congress’s deference to the President during wartime. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600 (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 9486(b) (2006)); see Johnsen, supra note 6, at 1575; see also
Martinez, supra note 88, at 2491 (“Proponents of the inherent executive power thesis argue that the
power to wage war is intrinsically ‘executive’ in nature.”). Such an effect is also compounded in
times of unified government, when Congress and the President are of the same political party. See
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 168, at 2314–15.
291. Constitutional avoidance in the executive context has been used to mean that the President
can “avoid” a constitutional dispute by asserting his own view of his constitutional obligations any
time the actions of another branch make an incursion onto the constitutional right of the executive to
exert its decision-making primacy in certain areas, such as in the conduct of war. See Morrison,
supra note 50, at 1218–19 (critiquing the OLC’s use of avoidance to assert more presidential power
than is granted under law). Congress attempted to address the question of constitutional avoidance
in 2002 through appropriations legislation that included a provision mandating notification to
Congress whenever the executive branch chooses not to enforce a law as written. See The 21st
Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, § 202, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 28
U.S.C. § 530D (2002). Unfortunately, the administration appears to have engaged in “meta
avoidance” by refusing to comply with the congressional notification requirement in the Act. See,
e.g., President’s Statement on Signing the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations
Authorization Act, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1971 (Nov. 2, 2002) (“[Section 530D] purports
to impose on the executive branch substantial obligations for reporting to the Congress activities of
the Department of Justice involving challenges to or nonenforcement of law that conflicts with the
Constitution. The executive branch shall construe section 530D . . . in a manner consistent with the
constitutional authorities of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch . . . .”); Letter
from Michael B. Mukasey, U.S. Att’y Gen., to Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader 1–6 (Nov. 14,
2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/2008/olc-reporting-act.pdf (encouraging the use of
constitutional avoidance to sidestep a reporting requirement regarding OLC opinions).
292. See Johnsen, supra note 6, at 1563; Morrison, supra note 50, at 1253–58. Members of
Congress, acknowledging the ineffectiveness of congressional oversight in the face of the heightened
use of executive privilege and constitutional avoidance, have voiced the belief that the courts are the
last safeguards of the separation of powers. Oversight Hearing Transcript, supra note 7, at 5, 16–
17. Sen. Specter has objected to this meta-use of constitutional avoidance, noting that even if
enforcement of a statute is “avoided” by the administration, that avoidance needs to be reported to
the appropriate committee in the Senate and House of Representatives. Id. at 15.
293. See OLC Reporting Act of 2008, S. 3501, 110th Cong. (2008) (as reported by S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, Sept. 16, 2008) (introduced by Sens. Feingold and Feinstein); Office of Legal Counsel

628

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

Further, an administration may argue that the question of mandatory
disclosure is a political one, and therefore not justiciable.294 However,
courts have made clear that although “decision-making in the fields of
foreign policy and national security is textually committed to the political
branches of government,”295 questions that pertain only to the disclosure
of policies related to national security matters and not to the substance of
those policies do not implicate the political question doctrine and are,
therefore, justiciable.296
Recent court decisions have further shown that the judiciary sees
some limits on the President’s use of the unitary executive theory and the
expansion of presidential power under the Commander-in-Chief
Clause,297 even in times of war.298 For example, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
squarely rejected the assertion of the Yoo Memorandum that “Congress
cannot exercise its authority to make rules for the Armed Forces to
regulate military commissions.”299 However, the Court’s acquiescence to
most administration claims of state secrets300 brings into serious question

Reporting Act of 2008, H.R. 6929, 110th Cong. (introduced by Rep. Miller). Both bills propose
amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 530D to oblige the Attorney General to report to Congress on non
enforcement of statutes based on OLC opinions claiming constitutional avoidance based on the
OLC’s reading of presidential power under Article II. Such an amendment has been supported by
former OLC lawyers and scholars. See Hearing on Restoring the Rule of Law: Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Walter
Dellinger, Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School); Trevor W. Morrison, Executive Branch
Avoidance and the Need for Congressional Notification, COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR, Feb. 15, 2007,
http://www.columbialawreview.org/articles/executive-branch-avoidence-and-the-need-for
congressional-notification. Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey counseled the use of executive
branch constitutional avoidance to sidestep the reporting requirements in this legislation. Mukasey,
supra note 291, at 3.
294. See, e.g., Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
295. Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
296. Wilson, 535 F.3d at 704.
297. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
298. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006) (“The Executive is bound to
comply with the Rule of Law . . . .”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality
opinion) (“We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President
when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”); al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 190–92 (4th
Cir. 2007) (denying the administration’s “breathtaking claim” that inherent executive power allows
the President to detain people indefinitely). Congress has limited the Judiciary’s ability to effect a
strong check on presidential overreaching. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a
(2006).
299. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 635 (citing Yoo Memorandum, supra note 69, at 13 n.13);
Interrogation Rules, Schroeder Statement, supra note 58, at 6.
300. See generally United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (establishing the standard by
which courts should evaluate government claims of state secrets); see also el-Masri v. United States,
479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007) (dismissing a claim of
extraordinary rendition and gross human rights abuses based on the administration’s claim of state
secrets).
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the effectiveness of the courts in safeguarding checks and balances in the
area of national security.
Since the Democrats took control of both houses of Congress in
2006, there has been a significant increase in oversight efforts.301
However, the Bush administration refused to comply with congressional
information requests through the waning days of the Bush presidency.302
As such, mandatory disclosure of OLC opinions would put greater
pressure on the administration to follow through with timely disclosure,
particularly if the defensive use of the opinions would be rendered
invalid without such disclosure.
Although the legislation proposed in 2008 mandating disclosure of
those OLC opinions which support executive branch avoidance was a
positive step, legislators should go further and mandate a broader
disclosure of OLC opinions. Congress is well within its oversight
powers to do so, and making a broader structural change is necessary to
restore the rule of law and the standing of the United States as a nation
that is a standard bearer for democratic principles.304 Eliminating the
existence of secret laws and restoring the democratic principles of the
application of law are two important means of doing so. As the court in
Ex parte Milligan explained:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection
all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No
doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented
by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended
during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine
leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on
which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution,
has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its
existence . . . .305

301. See Setty, supra note 113, at 261 n.70 (discussing the desire for congressional oversight of
the administration as one reason for the shift in party control of the Senate and House of
Representatives in 2006).
302. Editorial, Time to Vote Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008, at A34 (noting Congress’s
failure to enforce its own subpoenas on the administration).
304. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479
(2003) (addressing the idea that the United States is unique in its global reach for promoting
democratic ideals).
305. 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2, 120–21 (1866).
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VI. CONCLUSION
OLC memoranda, as a general rule, should be disclosed by the
administration. The politicization of the Office of Legal Counsel during
the Bush administration, when combined with the predictable selfinterest of any administration in not voluntarily disclosing its own legal
policies, means that institutional steps must be taken to ensure greater
transparency and adherence to the rule of law. To that end, Congress
should require publication of OLC-generated legal policies in order to
ensure the long-term integrity of executive branch constitutional
interpretation.

